Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 431
pro vyhledávání: '"DUNCAN PRITCHARD"'
Autor:
DUNCAN PRITCHARD
Publikováno v:
Manuscrito, Vol 44, Iss 4, Pp 3-30 (2021)
Abstract My interest is in the relationship between the contemporary account of the epistemology of religious belief, known as quasi-fideism, and the sceptical fideism that has been so important, historically, in motivating fideistic ideas. I argue t
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/3accdfac39354d81aa2f40f78d5db3e9
Autor:
Duncan Pritchard
Publikováno v:
Frontiers in Psychology, Vol 13 (2022)
A three-tiered account of social cognition is set out—along with the corresponding variety of social knowledge that results from this social cognition—and applied to the special case of scientific collaboration. The first tier is socially-facilit
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4d39d13a5e77490299bcc19c1681af04
Autor:
Duncan Pritchard
Publikováno v:
Philosophies, Vol 8, Iss 2, p 29 (2023)
This paper explores the thesis that the overarching goal of education is to cultivate virtuous intellectual character. It is shown how finally valuing the truth is central to this theory on account of how such valuing is pivotal to intellectual virtu
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/82763f70e58f4218971cadda08996115
Autor:
Duncan Pritchard
Publikováno v:
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, Vol 9, Iss 9 (2021)
My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions (e.g., rule-following, other minds,
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/f6c1e9ce9a1c4af880676f4f47369bfe
Autor:
Duncan Pritchard
Publikováno v:
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol 14, Iss 39 (2021)
The intellectual virtues are defined, in part, in terms of a love for the truth: veritic desire. Unpacking this idea is complicated, however, not least because of the difficulty of understanding the truth goal that is associated with veritic desire.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/3d059edcb37c4ee5990a5ac66c7ca3f4
Publikováno v:
Estudios de Filosofía, Iss 60, Pp 239-266 (2019)
Se afirma que el problema del escepticismo radical, en el que se centra gran parte de la discusión epistemológica contemporánea, se divide en dos formulaciones lógicamente distintas: una basada en el principio de clausura, y otra en el princi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/aa79494f649c4e39a9042462839cd1e9
Autor:
Christopher Ranalli, Duncan Pritchard
Publikováno v:
Humanities, Vol 2, Iss 3, Pp 351-368 (2013)
We revisit an important exchange on the problem of radical skepticism between Richard Rorty and Michael Williams. In his contribution to this exchange, Rorty defended the kind of transcendental approach to radical skepticism that is offered by Donald
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/17dcf072025942c3b20acf3e226ca16d
Autor:
Duncan Pritchard
Publikováno v:
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 04, Iss 2, Pp 187-214 (2000)
It has become almost a conventional wisdom to argue that Cartesian scepticism poses a far more radical sceptical threat than its classical Pyrrhonian counterpart. Such a view fails to recognise, however, that there is a species of sceptical concern t
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/35042cb04748455887f126748429ea30
Publikováno v:
Manuscrito, Vol 41, Iss 1, Pp 115-165
ABSTRACT This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/06be7419e1c840dc9aa7357c8b84b5c4
Autor:
Duncan Pritchard
Duncan Pritchard offers an original defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief that enjoys rational support which is both fa
