Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 145
pro vyhledávání: '"Dütting, Paul"'
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining items to maxim
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.11091
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively bid in an
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.07819
The increasing deployment of AI is shaping the future landscape of the internet, which is set to become an integrated ecosystem of AI agents. Orchestrating the interaction among AI agents necessitates decentralized, self-sustaining mechanisms that ha
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.18074
We introduce the notion of an online matroid embedding, which is an algorithm for mapping an unknown matroid that is revealed in an online fashion to a larger-but-known matroid. The existence of such embedding enables a reduction from the version of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.10316
Autor:
Dütting, Paul, Fusco, Federico, Lattanzi, Silvio, Norouzi-Fard, Ashkan, Zadimoghaddam, Morteza
Maximizing monotone submodular functions under cardinality constraints is a classic optimization task with several applications in data mining and machine learning. In this paper we study this problem in a dynamic environment with consistency constra
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.19977
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper we study natural combinatorial contract settings involving teams of a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.08260
Algorithmic contract design is a new frontier in the intersection of economics and computation, with combinatorial contracts being a core problem in this domain. A central model within combinatorial contracts explores a setting where a principal dele
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.09794
Autor:
Brustle, Johannes, Correa, José, Dütting, Paul, Ezra, Tomer, Feldman, Michal, Verdugo, Victor
We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the $(1-\varepsilon)$-competition complexity of different types of online algorithms. This metric asks for the smallest $k$ such
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11084
We investigate auction mechanisms for AI-generated content, focusing on applications like ad creative generation. In our model, agents' preferences over stochastically generated content are encoded as large language models (LLMs). We propose an aucti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.10826
We study the combinatorial contracting problem of D\"utting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary outcome (the agent can succeed or fail), and the succ
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.10766