Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Cunha, Alexandre B."'
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B., Ornelas, Emanuel
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2018 Jun 01. 16(3), 781-824.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/90023681
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B.1 research@alexbcunha.com
Publikováno v:
Brazilian Business Review (Portuguese Edition). Mar/Apr2021, Vol. 18 Issue 2, p196-216. 21p.
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B.
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 2013 Jun 01. 53(2), 357-382.
Externí odkaz:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0694-2
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B.
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 2008 May 01. 35(2), 267-291.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40282859
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 2006 Sep 01. 29(1), 181-195.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25056115
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B.1 research@alexbcunha.com
Publikováno v:
Revista Brasileira de Economia de Empresas / Brazilian Journal of Business Economics. Jul-Dez2007, Vol. 7 Issue 2, p59-62. 4p.
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B.1 abcunha13@globo.com, Sandes, Jorge Reis1 sandes@vetor.com.br, Cubas Vivanco, Luis Gustavo1 lvivanco@terra.com.br
Publikováno v:
Brazilian Business Review (Portuguese Edition). 2005, Vol. 2 Issue 2, p178-189. 14p.
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B., Ornelas, Emanuel
We study the desirability of limits on the public debt and of political turnover in an economy where incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimal level due to rent-seeking motives. Parties alternate in office and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::b00b6e402a8f16050d78ea334f95b63c
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/161868
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/161868
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B.1 sandes@vetor.com.br, Sandes, Jorge Reis1 lvivanco@terra.com.br, Cubas Vivanco, Luis Gustavo1 abcunha13@globo.com
Publikováno v:
Brazilian Business Review (English Edition). 2005, Vol. 2 Issue 2, p172-186. 15p.
Autor:
Cunha, Alexandre B., Ornelas, Emanuel
We consider an economy where competing political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimum level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they ca
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______206::593ac974d3f720d61c51d6b11172473c
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60273/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/60273/