Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s Egalitarian Solution on the Domain of Convex Games

Autor: Francesc Llerena, Peter Sudhölter, Pedro Calleja

Publikováno v: Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 95, 102477 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102477
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona

We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core.

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c3eb964da5e186eaf68d31411b5c713e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521