Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 26
pro vyhledávání: '"Colley, Rachael"'
In rank aggregation, members of a population rank issues to decide which are collectively preferred. We focus instead on identifying divisive issues that express disagreements among the preferences of individuals. We analyse the properties of our div
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08511
Autor:
Revel, Manon, Boehmer, Niclas, Colley, Rachael, Brill, Markus, Faliszewski, Piotr, Elkind, Edith
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in every democra
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.02774
We introduce new power indices to measure the a priori voting power of voters in liquid democracy elections where an underlying network restricts delegations. We argue that our power indices are natural extensions of the standard Penrose-Banzhaf inde
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.02462
Autor:
Navarrete, Carlos, Macedo, Mariana, Colley, Rachael, Zhang, Jingling, Ferrada, Nicole, Mello, Maria Eduarda, Lira, Rodrigo, Bastos-Filho, Carmelo, Grandi, Umberto, Lang, Jerome, Hidalgo, César A.
Digital technologies can augment civic participation by facilitating the expression of detailed political preferences. Yet, digital participation efforts often rely on methods optimized for elections involving a few candidates. Here we present data c
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04577
Many important collective decision-making problems can be seen as multi-agent versions of discrete optimisation problems. Participatory budgeting, for instance, is the collective version of the knapsack problem; other examples include collective sche
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.00574
We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own -- for instance, an agent's vote m
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2111.13145
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
Autor:
Navarrete, Carlos, Macedo, Mariana, Colley, Rachael, Zhang, Jingling, Ferrada, Nicole, Mello, Maria Eduarda, Lira, Rodrigo, Bastos-Filho, Carmelo, Grandi, Umberto, Lang, Jérôme, Hidalgo, César A.
Publikováno v:
Nature Human Behaviour; Jan2024, Vol. 8 Issue 1, p137-148, 12p
Autor:
Navarrete, Carlos, Ferrada, Nicole, Macedo, Mariana, Colley, Rachael, Zhang, Jingling, Grandi, Umberto, Lang, Jerome, Hidalgo, César A.
Since the seminal works of Condorcet and Borda, social choice theory has explored how to aggregate individual preferences into collective decisions. Yet, social choice theory has focused primarily on identifying winners in elections involving few can
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::507c06594b6b997a32c93a3d0a037e33
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04577
http://arxiv.org/abs/2211.04577
Akademický článek
Tento výsledek nelze pro nepřihlášené uživatele zobrazit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.
K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.