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of 144
pro vyhledávání: '"Colini Baldeschi A"'
The realm of algorithms with predictions has led to the development of several new algorithms that leverage (potentially erroneous) predictions to enhance their performance guarantees. The challenge is to devise algorithms that achieve optimal approx
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.03725
Autor:
Avadhanula, Vashist, Celli, Andrea, Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo, Leonardi, Stefano, Russo, Matteo
We study fully dynamic online selection problems in an adversarial/stochastic setting that includes Bayesian online selection, prophet inequalities, posted price mechanisms, and stochastic probing problems subject to combinatorial constraints. In the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.03099
In this work we introduce a new class of mechanisms composed of a traditional Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction and a fair division scheme, in order to achieve some desired level of fairness between groups of Bayesian strategic advertisers. We p
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.08271
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing mechanisms. We foc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09503
Autor:
Avadhanula, Vashist, Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo, Leonardi, Stefano, Sankararaman, Karthik Abinav, Schrijvers, Okke
We study the problem of an online advertising system that wants to optimally spend an advertiser's given budget for a campaign across multiple platforms, without knowing the value for showing an ad to the users on those platforms. We model this chall
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.10246
This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three contributi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.06177
Incentive compatibility (IC) is one of the most fundamental properties of an auction mechanism, including those used for online advertising. Recent methods by Feng et al. and Lahaie et al. show that counterfactual runs of the auction mechanism with d
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.07721
The Ad Types Problem (without gap rules) is a special case of the assignment problem in which there are $k$ types of nodes on one side (the ads), and an ordered set of nodes on the other side (the slots). The edge weight of an ad $i$ of type $\theta$
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.04400
Autor:
Alba Tristán‐Noguero, Irene Fernández‐Carasa, Carles Calatayud, Cristina Bermejo‐Casadesús, Meritxell Pons‐Espinal, Arianna Colini Baldeschi, Leticia Campa, Francesc Artigas, Analia Bortolozzi, Rosario Domingo‐Jiménez, Salvador Ibáñez, Mercè Pineda, Rafael Artuch, Ángel Raya, Àngels García‐Cazorla, Antonella Consiglio
Publikováno v:
EMBO Molecular Medicine, Vol 15, Iss 3, Pp 1-15 (2023)
Abstract Tyrosine hydroxylase deficiency (THD) is a rare genetic disorder leading to dopaminergic depletion and early‐onset Parkinsonism. Affected children present with either a severe form that does not respond to L‐Dopa treatment (THD‐B) or a
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e22ef144c32047569cfc1dd967018c9c
Autor:
Ezio Amorizzo, Gianni Colini-Baldeschi
Publikováno v:
Clinics and Practice, Vol 13, Iss 1, Pp 65-70 (2022)
Background: The aim of this retrospective uncontrolled article is to illustrate a technique of neurotomy of the sensitive branches of S1 S2 S3 in RFA that appears to result in a better success rate and longer-lasting pain relief. Methods: 40 patients
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c52d534f3a594e2d8d3a0cc8e5eb60e9