Výsledky vyhledávání - "Christopher Cotton"

Affirmative Action and Human Capital Investment: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment

Autor: Christopher Cotton, Brent R. Hickman, Joseph P. Price

Publikováno v: Journal of Labor Economics. 40:157-185

Pre-College human capital investment occurs within a competitive environment and depends on market incentives created by Affirmative Action (AA) in college admissions. These policies affect mechanisms for rank-order allocation of college seats, and a

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4cb0908641d65f942532b0c2bb8b8b47
https://doi.org/10.1086/713743

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Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Autor: Tommaso Reggiani, Christopher Cotton, Luca Corazzini

Publikováno v: Experimental Econonomics

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediar

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9dd3987d05f0cd777dc4ea361f9f1bc1
https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/129074/1/RR2_IZAwp___ccr2019_DelegationMPGG.pdf

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Productivity Versus Motivation in Adolescent Human Capital Production: Evidence from a Structurally-Motivated Field Experiment

Autor: John A. List, Sutanuka Roy, Joseph Price, Brent R. Hickman, Christopher Cotton

We leverage a field experiment across three distinct school districts to identify key pieces of a structural model of adolescent human capital production. Our focus is inspired by the contemporary psychology of education literature, which expresses l

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::df8354f0a28c02172206e2510da9662d
https://doi.org/10.3386/w27995

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Persistence of power: Repeated multilateral bargaining with endogenous agenda setting authority

Autor: Chloe Tergiman, Marina Agranov, Christopher Cotton

We extend a simple repeated, multilateral bargaining model to allow successful agenda setters to hold on to power as long as they maintain the support of a majority of other committee members. Theoretically and experimentally, we compare this Endogen

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e65032775f11e65683f845a1a6dfe9b4
https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20200319-144122348

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