Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"Chlaß, Nadine"'
Publikováno v:
In European Journal of Political Economy September 2019 59:108-128
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Chlaß, Nadine1 (AUTHOR), Gangadharan, Lata2 (AUTHOR) lata.gangadharan@monash.edu, Jones, Kristy3 (AUTHOR)
Publikováno v:
Oxford Economic Papers. Oct2023, Vol. 75 Issue 4, p941-961. 21p.
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Chlaß, Nadine, Perea, Andrés
Do individuals choose how to a solve a dynamic game or is their mode of reasoning a type-like predisposition? We show experimentally that an individual’s propensity to forwardly or backwardly induct is a function of (i) her belief whether an oppone
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::7c606c2297ec73d44470e1567a08af18
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145881
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145881
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::6022f7687740ab7f42f77fbb77b9d925
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204714
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/204714
Autor:
Chlaß, Nadine, Riener, Gerhard
We study individuals who can nudge themselves out of, or opt into a set of rules which either allows them to spy on an opponent, or to sabotage an opponent, or to fabricate payoff-relevant information on the opponent s moves. In an experiment, we obs
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::adbae39b4f5ea1354042fc5164583d1e
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/113222
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/113222
Charitable donations are often made through intermediaries who can fund themselves from these same donations. Donors who purchase charitable output through an intermediary incur a principal-agent problem with unobservable prices. We compare charitabl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::07f5898751866f553bacb3f757425082
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/126524
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/126524
Autor:
Chlaß, Nadine, Riener, Gerhard
We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::a3798f46d2bb49b38a50824d89338b65
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120864/1/836080149.pdf
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/120864/1/836080149.pdf
Autor:
Chlaß, Nadine, Moffatt, Peter G.
Traditionally, giving in dictator games was assumed to signal preferences over others' payoffs. To date, several studies find that dictator game giving breaks down under conditions designed to increase dictators' anonymity or if an option to take mon
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::3ecc790fa2cbf7304e2494be35c73f2f
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70170
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70170