Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 228
pro vyhledávání: '"Ching-To Albert Ma"'
Autor:
Tor Iversen, Ching-to Albert Ma
Publikováno v:
Health Economics. 31:443-465
We study primary care physicians' prevention and monitoring technology adoption. Physicians' adoption decisions are based on benefits and costs, which depend on payment incentives, educational assistance, and market characteristics. The empirical stu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::80da0a5cc58145026a22e3780da38a77
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4447
https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4447
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 152:296-313
A Principal has a set of projects, each having different benefit potentials, and each requiring a basic technology from one of two experts and time inputs from both experts. Experts enjoy motivation utilities from production, but have private informa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5ae0d0b2e10091b8aea31bde3764fc40
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.05.003
Autor:
Mingshan Lu, Ching-To Albert Ma
Publikováno v:
Inquiry: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing, Vol 43 (2006)
This study looks at the effect of performance-based contracting (PBC) on administrative information misreports in substance abuse treatment in Maine. For about 700 alcohol abuse treatment episodes in the period 1990–1995, we constructed clinician r
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/dff28e2bb84e4bec871f4b57bf46c487
Autor:
Liisa T. Laine, Ching-to Albert Ma
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 140:336-353
We study a multistage, quality-then-price game between a public firm and a private firm. The market consists of a set of consumers who have different quality valuations. The public firm aims to maximize social surplus, whereas the private firm maximi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::005361d307f19e118402f1f87a1497b0
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.012
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.012
Autor:
Henry Y. Mak, Ching-to Albert Ma
Health services providers receive payments mostly from private or public insurers rather than patients. Provider incentive problems arise because an insurer misses information about the provider and patients, and has imperfect control over the provid
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bfffbf430f27a648ddd9132df79e6ab9
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625979.013.61
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190625979.013.61
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies how altruistic preferences are changed by markets and incentives. We conduct a laboratory experiment in a within-subject design. Subjects are asked to choose health care qualities for hypothetical patients in monopoly, duopoly, and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e182149715c5fbc6d38aca6e7b718930
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431002
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3431002
Autor:
Biglaiser, Gary1 gbiglais@email.unc.edu, Ching-to Albert Ma2 ma@bu.edu
Publikováno v:
RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell). Winter2007, Vol. 38 Issue 4, p1113-1133. 21p.
Publikováno v:
Journal of health economics. 66
Taiwanese Labor, Government Employee, and Farmer Insurance programs provide 5 to 6 months of salary to enrollees who undergo hysterectomies or oophorectomies before their 45th birthday. These programs create incentives for more and earlier treatments
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::48a343fe406c7abbb4b9d58a9a7cab55
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31071646
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/31071646
Publikováno v:
Barigozzi, Francesca ; Ma, Ching-to Albert (2016) Product Differentiation with Multiple Qualities. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 43. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5407 . In: Quaderni-Working Paper DSE (1075). ISSN 2282-6483.
We study subgame-perfect equilibria of the classical quality-price, multistage game of vertical product differentiation. Each of two firms can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities. Consumers’ valuations are drawn from independent a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e4eac86065efe37220850462f86600e4
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/649374
http://hdl.handle.net/11585/649374