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pro vyhledávání: '"Charlotte Klempt"'
Autor:
Charlotte Klempt, Kerstin Pull
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 39:158-170
Sanctions are widely used to enhance compliance in principal agent relationships. Although there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may reduce compliance b
Publikováno v:
Homo Oeconomicus. 34:97-115
In our paper, we aim at assessing the most crucial cognitive step in forward looking decision deliberation, the mental representation of a decision task. Rather than discussing it abstractly, we study mental representation experimentally with pairs o
Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asym
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::79e3a05dad960e45959cf61680bf1cc6
https://hdl.handle.net/10900/75189
https://hdl.handle.net/10900/75189
We confront allocator participants with dierent sharing games in a within sub- jects design: the Nash demand game, the ultimatum game, the yes-no-game and the impunity game. We allow participants to opt out rather than play the game under considerati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::41c88e5685d919d59a77ea1bd2569f01
http://www.iaw.edu/RePEc/iaw/pdf/iaw_dp_118.pdf
http://www.iaw.edu/RePEc/iaw/pdf/iaw_dp_118.pdf
Autor:
Charlotte Klempt
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 116:429-431
This paper differentiates between three motives behind punishment in a social dilemma: minimizing inequalities, retaliation against unfair acts, and spitefulness. The experiment shows that cooperators and defectors differently respond to intentions a
Two participants have to decide jointly, with the discussions preceding their choice being video/audiotaped. For two tasks, one with and one without strategic interaction, we refer to obvious reasoning styles as mental models. The videotaped discussi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::b57172ac083b9bc5a29b519008061d96
http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2013_012.pdf
http://pubdb.wiwi.uni-jena.de/pdf/wp_2013_012.pdf
Autor:
Charlotte Klempt
Cooperation via indirect reciprocity uses a partner's reputation to enable subjects to direct help to those who cooperated themselves. As a partner's reputation provides information whether the partner helped a third party in the past or not, subject
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::220ee20216b9004f4c58cfeab62014e6
http://www.iaw.edu/RePEc/iaw/pdf/iaw_dp_88.pdf
http://www.iaw.edu/RePEc/iaw/pdf/iaw_dp_88.pdf
Autor:
Charlotte Klempt, Kerstin Pull
Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce complia
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::3d378a4b4ee0cf13f91fed8f899a923a
http://www.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2010/wp_2010_013.pdf
http://www.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2010/wp_2010_013.pdf
Autor:
Charlotte Klempt, Kerstin Pull
We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the informa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::9e1d8ed2f5d5e84646986827fbef5447
http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/receive/jportal_jparticle_00146436
http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/receive/jportal_jparticle_00146436