Zobrazeno 1 - 4
of 4
pro vyhledávání: '"Charlotte Franziska Unruh"'
Autor:
Charlotte Franziska Unruh
Publikováno v:
Journal of Moral Philosophy. :1-21
Many people hold the constraint against doing harm, the view that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. Mogensen and MacAskill (2021) have recently argued that when consid
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2da5d53a636c88f53bca8d16ab837c0b
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223642
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223642
Autor:
Charlotte Franziska Unruh
Publikováno v:
Journal of Applied Philosophy. 38:857-869
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f0cd77493397fda2c1df16e9869a5959
https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12532
https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12532
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 2022 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::97d2d91adaf6df12d5420b9ca7d9e1b1
https://doi.org/10.1145/3514094.3534168
https://doi.org/10.1145/3514094.3534168
Autor:
Charlotte Franziska Unruh
Recent work by Ingmar Persson and Jason Hanna has posed an interesting new challenge for deontologists: How can they account for so-called cases of letting oneself do harm? In this article, I argue that cases of letting oneself do harm are structural
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b3cd6da3954358e0a24f5f9976603017
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/444826/
https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/444826/
