Zobrazeno 1 - 6
of 6
pro vyhledávání: '"Charles Z. Zheng"'
Autor:
Fredrik Ødegaard, Charles Z. Zheng
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 52:195-230
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0f753e3ece92751c1652a2e1b899bfb3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00815-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00815-2
Autor:
Mingshi Kang, Charles Z. Zheng
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 75:1141-1180
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5c2fad62cb01fe94ef2648d91aa0bf41
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01442-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-022-01442-4
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 203:105476
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8acdfa836b0d3a36aeb99080816c9b40
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105476
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105476
Autor:
Charles Z. Zheng
Existence of a monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is proved for a multistage game of first-price auctions with interbidder resale, with any finite number of ex ante different bidders. Endogenous gains at resale complicate the winner
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::70f8ecc98042b5e383cbbcb5369e5b5b
http://economics.uwo.ca/epri/workingpapers_docs/wp2014/Zheng_01.pdf
http://economics.uwo.ca/epri/workingpapers_docs/wp2014/Zheng_01.pdf
We consider auction environments in which bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations and study the optimal selling mechanisms in such environments. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, whic
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::1db9a77f84c7c88b4b93ed867dce4526
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1420.pdf
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1420.pdf
Autor:
Charles Z. Zheng
A long-standing unsolved problem, often arising from auctions with multidimensional bids, is how to design seller-optimal auctions when bidders' private characteristics differ in many dimensions. This paper partially solves the problem in an auction
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::198472a3045cd8f84ee78e60e48543e6
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0296.pdf
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0296.pdf