Zobrazeno 1 - 4
of 4
pro vyhledávání: '"Caroline Berden"'
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 133, 77-84. Elsevier Science
We consider a model where the same group of players is involved in more than one cooperative (transferable utility) game. A rule determines the payoffs per game, and for each player a utility function evaluates the resulting vector of payoffs. We ass
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6c9409de93ee663fcfdd36d42aa005a1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.003
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1), 39-51. Academic Press Inc.
Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 39-51. Elsevier Science
Games and Economic Behavior, 73, 39-51. Elsevier Science
In an estate division problem an estate has to be divided among several players whose total entitlement to the estate exceeds its size. This paper extends the non-cooperative approach through a claim game, as initiated by o'neill (1982), by allowing
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bfb122b2ad7f696a6998b44b6fbbbaf7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.008
Autor:
Caroline Berden, Hans Peters
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision, 359-370. Springer, Cham
ISSUE=60;STARTPAGE=359;ENDPAGE=370;ISSN=0040-5833;TITLE=Theory and Decision
ISSUE=60;STARTPAGE=359;ENDPAGE=370;ISSN=0040-5833;TITLE=Theory and Decision
Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is es
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5363043c91aa697d45fdaf224b5b331e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-3986-1
Autor:
Caroline Berden, Hans Peters
Publikováno v:
The Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7(1)
The effect of replacing an agent in a two-person two-state finance economy by a more risk averse agent is studied. It is established under which conditions the other agent benefits or looses in equilibrium from dealing with a more risk averse agent.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::af1fc1a882b4c8ccf01b0c23f8e9398a
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1394
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1394
