Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 11
pro vyhledávání: '"Carmelo Rodríguez Álvarez"'
Publikováno v:
Nicolo, A & Rodrguez-Alvarez, C 2017, ' Age-Based Preferences in Paired Kidney Exchange ', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 102, pp. 508-524 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.006
We consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidney
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d99297bf786ce7eb1e7face41966e485
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.006
Publikováno v:
The Manchester School. 85:395-429
We analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes are ca
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f5c3bade7246b233941c1416b95aee7
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12151
https://doi.org/10.1111/manc.12151
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 74:299-310
Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor–patient pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among several pairs. Further efficiency gains may emerge if the programs consider th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4cd5248cfbb47973696a1e97d354838c
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.009
Autor:
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 32:29-35
In a recent paper, Sato (Soc Choice Welf doi: 10.1007/s00355-007-0285-5) has provided two alternative definitions of strategy-proofness for social choice correspondences and proved that they are incompatible with the joint requirements of anonymity,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fb9a8d854230883646a4c7712268e620
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0309-9
Autor:
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 29:175-199
Duggan and Schwartz (Soc Choice and Welfare 17: 85–93, 2000) have proposed a generalization of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem to multivalued social choice rules. They show that only dictatorial rules are strategy-proof and satisfy citizens sov
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2c854695e5b2f428495068644dde9bed
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0212-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0212-1
Autor:
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 27:545-570
We extend the analysis of Dutta et al. (in Econometrica, 69:1013–1038, 2001) on strategic candidacy to multivalued environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters’ preferences over running candidates, a voting correspondence selects set
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::734d5be77dc57c52ac0dcdbf1f41c7c3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0126-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0126-y
Autor:
Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 27:657-677
We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each agenda and each profile of voters’ preferences over running candidates, a probabilistic voting procedure sele
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a3cbd93d056a87493893f789561050cd
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0564-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0564-7
We analyze centralized housing markets under the existence of feasibility constraints on the number of agents and objects involved in the exchanges. We focus on an incomplete information setting where only the information about how each agent ranks h
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7e898633727989f35a09cb83a2480fb7
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/2526065
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/2526065
We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::281cb6afa79f733b7b1e1fb8fdb23681
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2009/NDL2009-031.pdf
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL2009/NDL2009-031.pdf
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We propose a model of Kidney-Exchange that incorporates the main European institutional features. We assume that patients do not consider all compatible kidneys homogeneous and patients are endowed with reservation values over the minimal quality of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ce716642b80846fe2cc6138c793eaaca
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443206
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443206