Zobrazeno 1 - 3
of 3
pro vyhledávání: '"Cécile Baritel-Ruet"'
Autor:
José B. Almeida, Alley Stoughton, Benjamin Grégoire, Pierre-Yves Strub, Gilles Barthe, Manuel Barbosa, François Dupressoir, Cécile Baritel-Ruet, Vincent Laporte, Tiago Oliveira
Publikováno v:
CCS 2019-26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
CCS 2019-26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2019, London, United Kingdom. pp.1607-1622, ⟨10.1145/3319535.3363211⟩
CCS
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Bacelar Almeida, J, Barbosa, M, Baritel-Ruet, C, Barthe, G, Dupressoir, F, Grégoire, B, Laporte, V, Oliveira, T, Strub, P-Y & Stoughton, A 2019, Machine-Checked Proofs for Cryptographic Standards : Indifferentiability of Sponge and secure high-assurance implementations of SHA-3 . in CCS'19 : Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security . Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), pp. 1607-1622, ACM CCS 2019, London, United Kingdom, 11/11/19 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363211
CCS 2019-26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Nov 2019, London, United Kingdom. pp.1607-1622, ⟨10.1145/3319535.3363211⟩
CCS
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Bacelar Almeida, J, Barbosa, M, Baritel-Ruet, C, Barthe, G, Dupressoir, F, Grégoire, B, Laporte, V, Oliveira, T, Strub, P-Y & Stoughton, A 2019, Machine-Checked Proofs for Cryptographic Standards : Indifferentiability of Sponge and secure high-assurance implementations of SHA-3 . in CCS'19 : Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security . Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), pp. 1607-1622, ACM CCS 2019, London, United Kingdom, 11/11/19 . https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363211
We present a high-assurance and high-speed implementation of the SHA-3 hash function. Our implementation is written in the Jasmin programming language, and is formally verified for functional correctness, provable security and timing attack resistanc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::81ad6142ce1106a8c1d25f32a2c29be8
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02404581/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02404581/document
Publikováno v:
CSF 2018-31st EEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
CSF 2018-31st EEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Jul 2018, Oxford, United Kingdom
CSF
CSF 2018-31st EEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, Jul 2018, Oxford, United Kingdom
CSF
International audience; The CMAC standard, when initially proposed by Iwata and Kurosawa as OMAC1, was equipped with a complex game-based security proof. Following recent advances in formal verification for game-based security proofs, we formalize a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ec7842f37c208ced4c73008a6a062835
https://hal.science/hal-01959554/document
https://hal.science/hal-01959554/document
Autor:
HASELWARTER, PHILIPP G., RIVAS, EXEQUIEL, VAN MUYLDER, ANTOINE, WINTERHALTER, THÉO, ABATE, CARMINE, SIDORENCO, NIKOLAJ, HRIŢCU, CĂTĂLIN, MAILLARD, KENJI, SPITTERS, BAS
Publikováno v:
ACM Transactions on Programming Languages & Systems; Sep2023, Vol. 45 Issue 3, p1-61, 61p
