Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 15
pro vyhledávání: '"Brams, S. J."'
Autor:
Brams, S. J., Fishburn, P. C.
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 1984 Jan 01. 1(3), 211-229.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41105781
Autor:
Brams, S. J., Kilgour, M. D.
Using truels, or three-person duels, as an example, we show that how players perceive a multiple-round game will end can make a big difference in whether it ends non-cooperatively (producing a "bang") or just peters out (producing a "whimper"): 1. If
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::9303504b06aed3791eefe6d783ee5ecd
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-05.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-05.PDF
Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally singlepeaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::518f34d3113dca919e2f1d9750d09e54
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-06.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-06.PDF
Autor:
Barbanel, J. B., Brams, S. J.
The minimal number of parallel cuts required to divide a cake into n pieces is n-1. A new 3-person procedure, requiring 2 parallel cuts, is given that produces an envy- free division, whereby each person thinks he or she receives at least a tied- for
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::36c0f26906fa14d0c8c6603a482e21cc
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-07.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-07.PDF
This paper analyzes criteria of fair division of a set of indivisible items among people whose revealed preferences are limited to rankings of the items and for whom no side payments are allowed. The criteria include refinements of Pareto optimality
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::1c132f324afdf035bbf759715e4fa5a7
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-15.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-15.PDF
Two or more players are required to divide up a set of indivisible items that they can rank from best to worst. They may, as well, be able to indicate preferences over subsets, or packages, of items. The main criteria used to assess the fairness of a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::ee480969c247c6117b1c54610dfdfa4a
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-13.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-13.PDF
Autor:
Brams, S. J., Fishburn, P. C.
In the first competitive election for President of the Social Choice and Welfare Society, the (official) approval-voting winner differed from the (hypothetical) Borda count winner, who was also the Condorcet winner. But because the election was essen
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::2b1d4f92e1c846cd7a1c7cd8a76dc139
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-06.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-06.PDF
It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultan
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::63af6ec1f9ffc04325dfe1f1d03dfc03
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-19.PDF
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-19.PDF
Autor:
Brams, S. J., Straffin, P. D., Davis, M. D., Cruz, J. B., Dragan, I., Nakayama, M., Roth, A. E., Malouf, M. W. K., Shapley, L. S., Milnor, J. W., Topkis, D. M., Toraoka, Y., van Moeseke, P., Young, H. P.
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory; June 1980, Vol. 9 Issue: 2 p117-123, 7p
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory; December 1971, Vol. 1 Issue: 1 p269-272, 4p