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pro vyhledávání: '"Bram Van Heuveln"'
Autor:
Bram Van Heuveln
Publikováno v:
Informal Logic, Vol 20, Iss 1 (2000)
A number of modern logic books give a misrepresentation of Mill's Methods as originally conceived by Mill. In this paper, I point out what I believe is a better presentation of Mill's Methods. This treatment is not only historically more accurate, bu
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a6c29baa587248949e35f9848338471b
Publikováno v:
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness. :127-151
Philosophy and AI have had a difficult relationship from the beginning. The “classic” period from 1950 to 2000 saw four major conflicts, first about the logical coherence of AI as an endeavor, and then about architecture, semantics, and the Frame
Winner of the 2022 CHOICE Outstanding Academic TitlesThis book surveys and examines the most famous philosophical arguments against building a machine with human-level intelligence. From claims and counter-claims about the ability to implement consci
Autor:
Bram Van Heuveln
Publikováno v:
Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence. 18:149-155
There are two main theories as to how humans reason deductively. Mental logic theory states that humans reason through the application of formal reasoning schemas of the kind encountered in formal logic. Mental model theory states that humans reason
Autor:
Owen Kellett, Andrew Shilliday, Bram Van Heuveln, Jeffrey Baumes, Selmer Bringsjord, Joshua Taylor, Kyle Ross, Yingrui Yang
Publikováno v:
Applied Mathematics and Computation. 176:516-530
Do human persons hypercompute? Or, as the doctrine of computationalism holds, are they information processors at or below the Turing Limit? If the former, given the essence of hypercomputation, persons must in some real way be capable of infinitary i
Autor:
Bram Van Heuveln
Publikováno v:
Teaching Philosophy. 27:167-172
Autor:
Bram Van Heuveln, Selmer Bringsjord
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 63:61-70
Jc. Beall (2001) argues that Yablo's (1993) paradox, despite Sorensen's (1998) defence to the contrary, is circular. The crux of Beall's case is the view that we have but two ways to fix the referent 3(t) of some term t: Demonstration or Description.
Publikováno v:
Minds and Machines. 8:237-249
David Chalmers‘ dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position