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pro vyhledávání: '"Bram Driesen"'
Autor:
Bram Driesen
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 12, Iss 4, p 87 (2021)
This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ed7ee163955545afa48a43f1b58ce2d8
Autor:
Bram Driesen
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 46:777-809
We reconsider the class of weighted Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions of Dubra (Econ Lett 73:131–136, 2001), and using methods of Imai (Econometrica 51:389–401, 1983), extend their characterization to the domain of multilateral bargaining problems. Asi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2740dd13b10e3c765870b8cfd515f7bd
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0936-x
This paper provides a non-cooperative foundation for (asymmetric generalizations of) the continuous Raiffa solution. Specifically, we consider a continuous-time variation of the classic Stahl–Rubinstein bargaining model, in which there is a finite
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bdc256f7ddaa759e98fc0eacbd792c73
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/135777/13/135777.pdf
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/135777/13/135777.pdf
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 67, 162-170. Elsevier Science
We study feasible sets of the bargaining problem under two different as-\ud sumptions: the players are subjective expected utility maximizers or the\ud players are Choquet expected utility maximizers. For the latter case, we\ud consider the effects o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::955dffe08628c6c325383145fd19d256
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/120266/7/120266.pdf
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/120266/7/120266.pdf
Autor:
Bram Driesen
This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable number of agents–Anonymity (AN), Individual Monotonicity (IM), and Consistency (CONS)–characterize a one-parameter family of Truncated Lexim
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5fc1278f9a2082c6eb713abdf68e25f3
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/121222/7/121222.pdf
https://eprints.gla.ac.uk/121222/7/121222.pdf
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 64(2), 103-118. Elsevier
The Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game is reconsidered under the assumption that each player is loss averse and the associated reference point is equal to the highest turned down offer of the opponent in the past. This makes the payoffs an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bdc709a49d47c4c6bbbd2c2b470c5db4
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.010
Autor:
Bram Driesen
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 114:288-291
In this note we introduce a new axiom for bargaining solutions, named Proportional Concession Monotonicity (PCM), which imposes that no player benefits when all players collectively make proportional concessions with respect to their respective utopi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4e34c49a88d02ef0d0e7353f2073e236
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.028
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.10.028
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 75(2), 481-489. Academic Press
This paper presents a general technique for comparing the concavity of different utility functions when probabilities need not be known. It generalizes: (a) Yaariʼs comparisons of risk aversion by not requiring identical beliefs; (b) Kreps and Porte
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::90d5251e15e2a90584544975ee379c1f
https://hdl.handle.net/1765/37781
https://hdl.handle.net/1765/37781
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences, 61(1), 58-64. Elsevier
We consider bargaining problems under the assumption that players are loss averse, i.e., experience disutility from obtaining an outcome lower than some reference point. We follow the approach of Shalev (2002) by imposing the self-supporting conditio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f384c97c3886b41ea60317ac8222e478
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.003
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision, 68(4), 367-391. Springer, Cham
In this article three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games are studied. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points-points below which they consider payof
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5507da48095dc57d8dbe1bd7ce35292c