Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 39
pro vyhledávání: '"Bonifacio, Agustin G."'
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in two-sided matching markets where only substitutability on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we use Tarski operators defined on the lattices of worker-quasi-stable and f
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21198
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it? We present an algorithm that models this situation as a re-stabilizati
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07084
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM is suffic
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.06546
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Autor:
Bonifacio, Agustin G.
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibba
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.04587
Autor:
Bonifacio, Agustin G.
In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.12794
In a voting problem with a finite set of alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only rules. Since all non-dictatorial (onto) voting rules are manipulable when there are more than two alternatives and all preferences are allowe
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.11627
We study the ability of different classes of voting rules to induce agents to report their preferences truthfully, if agents want to avoid regret. First, we show that regret-free truth-telling is equivalent to strategy-proofness among tops-only rules
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2208.13853
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.10758
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong cor
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2203.16293
Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: A proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
Autor:
Bonifacio, Agustín G.
Publikováno v:
In Mathematical Social Sciences July 2024 130:1-3