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‘NEXT’ events: a cooperative game theoretic view to festivals

Autor: Luc Champarnaud, Amandine Ghintran, Frédéric Jouneau-Sion

Publikováno v: Theory and Decision
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2021, ⟨10.1007/s11238-021-09810-7⟩
Theory and Decision, 2021, ⟨10.1007/s11238-021-09810-7⟩

International audience; During a cultural festival, artists and theaters act as a cartel by agreeing on pricing decisions that maximize the groups’ profit as a whole. We model the problem of sharing the profit created by a festival among organizing

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::304634ccb805f427f531a7d5f1f18abb
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09810-7

Fictitious play in networks

Autor: Kremena Valkanova, Christian Ewerhart

Publikováno v: Games and Economic Behavior. 123:182-206

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous-time fictitious play converges to the set of Nash equilibria if the overall n-person game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1/T

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ff90663245a42ea36c69a6e9f0e1bbb8
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.006

Fixed-point approaches to the proof of the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem

Autor: Metin Uyanik, Jean Guillaume Forand

Publikováno v: Economic Theory Bulletin. 7:117-124

We provide two new proofs of the Bondareva–Shapley theorem, which states that the core of a transferable utility cooperative game has a nonempty core if and only if the game is balanced. Both proofs exploit the fixed points of self-maps of the set

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aac727677c71b29e6a060eb50134e8ac
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-018-0146-7

A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game

Autor: Hao Sun, Panfei Sun, Dongshuang Hou, Theo Driessen

Publikováno v: Games and economic behavior, 108, 162-169. Academic Press

The main goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we introduce the so-called airport cost pooling game, which is a generalization of the well-known class of airport game (Littlechild and Thompson, 1977). We determine the Shapley value of this class of

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::68d10e76eaf6cc435f34633fe3ea20b1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.007