Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 10
pro vyhledávání: '"Bobak Pakzad-Hurson"'
Autor:
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 15:627-659
Consider indivisible-object allocation with contracts, such as college admissions, where contracts specify majors. Can a designer guarantee a stable and (student) efficient matching? I show that contracts put stability and efficiency at odds; a neces
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::17ae7cbcf9ba0986717a9428fd11d675
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210109
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210109
Autor:
Zoë B. Cullen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 91:765-802
The discourse around pay transparency has focused on partial equilibrium effects: how workers rectify pay inequities through informed renegotiation. We investigate how employers respond in equilibrium. We study a model of bargaining under two‐sided
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ba8f360acea96ae510f1c7aacfbe5864
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta19788
https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta19788
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9a1309c362e0f7b9c4ad312e8e5c2c5f
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538274
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538274
Autor:
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::601e67c46408c472cd83afc4c01f932c
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538266
https://doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538266
Autor:
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, Zoë B. Cullen
The public discourse around pay transparency has focused on the direct effect: how workers seek to rectify newly-disclosed pay inequities through renegotiations. The question of how wage-setting and hiring practices of the firm respond in equilibrium
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::56ee68ce78715f7ad57e0d0841c7ff1e
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28903
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28903
Autor:
Zoe Cullen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0d9f2ed4423a397e1f76cc414d9a414b
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3866335
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3866335
Autor:
Stephen Nei, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 197:105329
Decisions agents make before and after matching can be strategically linked through the match. We demonstrate this linkage in a game where universities either require students to commit to majors before matriculating or allow students to pick majors
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::037cf5da24d735d571b08ee62b3ec420
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105329
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105329
Autor:
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, Zoë B. Cullen
Publikováno v:
EC
Public discourse on pay transparency has not focused on equilibrium effects: how greater transparency impacts hiring and bargaining. To study these effects, we combine a dynamic wage-bargaining model with data from online markets for low-skill, tempo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3b575bcf90fdf6ec47344d32e28732d9
https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329645
https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329645
Autor:
Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The theory of optimal mechanism design often relies on the assumption that agents fully know their preferences. More realistically, preferences may be based on characteristics of goods which are observed via noisy, informative signals. Can markets ag
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a619d40cb6cae71b004cbbed171a49aa
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2618837
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2618837
Autor:
Stephen Nei, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
What happens after agents match can lead to strategic behavior that is often overlooked in matching theory. We demonstrate the linkage between pre- and post-match actions by introducing a game in which universities can force students to commit to maj
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b2ab160ee2143257ddb17015c432a6f0
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2523224
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2523224