Výsledky vyhledávání - "Bikhchandani, Sushil"

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Continuity and Monotonicity of Preferences and Probabilistic Equivalence

We show that probabilistic equivalence of a regret-based preference relationship over random variables is implied by a weak form of continuity and monotonicity.
Comment: 5 pages, 0 figures

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.17529

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Kniha

The analytics of uncertainty and information / Sushil Bikhchandani, University of California -- Los Angeles, Jack Hirshleifer, John G. Riley, University of California, Los Angeles. [elektronicky zdroj]

Autor: Bikhchandani, Sushil, author

Externí odkaz: Kolekce e-knih KNAV

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Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

Autor: Bikhchandani, Sushil, Mishra, Debasis

We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buy

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.10137

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Akademický článek

Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: An equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

Autor: Bikhchandani, Sushil, Mishra, Debasis

Publikováno v: In Journal of Economic Theory December 2024 222

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Information Cascades and Social Learning

Autor: Bikhchandani, Sushil, Hirshleifer, David, Tamuz, Omer, Welch, Ivo

We review the theory of information cascades and social learning. Our goal is to describe in a relatively integrated and accessible way the more important themes, insights and applications of the literature as it has developed over the last thirty ye

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/2105.11044

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Selling Two Identical Objects

Autor: Bikhchandani, Sushil, Mishra, Debasis

Publikováno v: Journal of Economic Theory, 200 (2022), 105397

It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical, indivisible object

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/2009.11545

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