Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Bijan Fadaeinia"'
Publikováno v:
Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, Vol 2024, Iss 4 (2024)
In recent research studies, an observable dependency has been found between the static power consumption of a Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) chip and its internally stored and processed data. For the most part, these studies have focu
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ab851c8e9fff4d14a96ee345ab77bdf8
Publikováno v:
IEEE Access, Vol 9, Pp 90455-90464 (2021)
As an outstanding cell-level countermeasure to defeat power analysis attacks, dual-rail pre-charge logics rely on balanced complementary paths. During the circuit lifetime, the gates undergo unavoidable changes due to the so-called device aging, henc
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e9b211f7b5fc41d0befafee1255d0be6
Publikováno v:
Applied Sciences, Vol 11, Iss 15, p 7143 (2021)
The imbalance of the currents leaked by CMOS standard cells when different logic values are applied to their inputs can be exploited as a side channel to recover the secrets of cryptographic implementations. Traditional side-channel countermeasures,
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b578c282e4c440d2b226df474c9b712d
Autor:
Bijan Fadaeinia, Amir Moradi
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing. 9:2175-2188
Nowadays there is no doubt on the susceptibility of cryptographic devices to side-channel analysis attacks. During the last decade, integration of corresponding countermeasures into devices which deal with security and privacy of users has become a m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::893e5fe6bfca692c8e4eb3fabbba947a
https://doi.org/10.1109/tetc.2020.2976711
https://doi.org/10.1109/tetc.2020.2976711
Publikováno v:
IEEE Access, Vol 9, Pp 90455-90464 (2021)
As an outstanding cell-level countermeasure to defeat power analysis attacks, dual-rail pre-charge logics rely on balanced complementary paths. During the circuit lifetime, the gates undergo unavoidable changes due to the so-called device aging, henc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dd765bec02362ae97373d33d77d0c1e9
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9460963/
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9460963/
Publikováno v:
2022 23rd International Symposium on Quality Electronic Design (ISQED).
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::06c52bb19b4ab760ef6a4909eea68a24
https://doi.org/10.1109/isqed54688.2022.9806232
https://doi.org/10.1109/isqed54688.2022.9806232
Publikováno v:
Applied Sciences
Volume 11
Issue 15
Applied Sciences, Vol 11, Iss 7143, p 7143 (2021)
Volume 11
Issue 15
Applied Sciences, Vol 11, Iss 7143, p 7143 (2021)
The imbalance of the currents leaked by CMOS standard cells when different logic values are applied to their inputs can be exploited as a side channel to recover the secrets of cryptographic implementations. Traditional side-channel countermeasures,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::78b7e4706ea098860fade0ffed6d1706
Publikováno v:
ASP-DAC
Side-channel analysis attacks exploit the physical characteristics of cryptographic chip implementations to extract their embedded secret keys. In particular, Power Analysis (PA) attacks make use of the dependency of the power consumption on the data
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::94b89026a90d3529c29a81c78dcdd3c2
https://doi.org/10.1145/3394885.3431597
https://doi.org/10.1145/3394885.3431597