Zobrazeno 1 - 7
of 7
pro vyhledávání: '"Bidénam Kambia-Chopin"'
Autor:
Bidénam Kambia-Chopin
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Law and Economics. 30:77-87
This paper examines a setting in which a firm is liable to pay environmental damages caused by its activity but may not have sufficient wealth for repair of damages. In order to induce the full internalization of the environmental cost, the firm is r
Autor:
Bidénam Kambia-Chopin
Publikováno v:
Revue d'économie politique. 117(2):285-308
Cet article etudie la prevention des risques environnementaux a travers les mecanismes du droit de la responsabilite civile. Dans un premier temps, une typologie des dommages environnementaux est dressee, puis les principaux regimes de responsabilite
Publikováno v:
Annals of Economics and Statistics. (82):55-70
This paper considers a competitive insurance market under moral hazard and adverse selection, in which preventive efforts and self-protection costs are unobservable by insurance companies. Under reasonable assumptions, the conclusions of Rothschild a
Autor:
Bidénam Kambia-Chopin
Publikováno v:
Articles. 79:327-347
Nous considérons un marché concurrentiel de l’assurance en présence d’aléa moral dans lequel le niveau du coût de l’autoprotection de l’assuré est son information privée. Nous caractérisons alors l’équilibre en contrats du marché
Autor:
Marc Perronnin, Bidénam Kambia-Chopin
On January 1st 2008, a 0.5€ deductible levied on every prescription drug package purchased was introduced in France. This study aims at shedding light on the effect of this policy on prescription drug purchasing behavior among the targeted individu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::f0a7febc3b0ccf47faccf3a64cca21aa
http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/WorkingPapers/DT54DeductiblesAndDemandPrescriptionDrugs.pdf
http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/WorkingPapers/DT54DeductiblesAndDemandPrescriptionDrugs.pdf
Autor:
Michel Grignon, Bidénam Kambia-Chopin
This paper examines the demand for complementary health insurance (CHI) in the non-group market in France and the reasons why the near poor seem price insensitive. First we develop a theoretical model based on a simple tradeoff between two goods: CHI
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::24ee9a4b6a11dcf4011570ccaa841005
http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/WorkingPapers/DT24IncomeDemandComplementHealthInsuranceFrance.pdf
http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/WorkingPapers/DT24IncomeDemandComplementHealthInsuranceFrance.pdf
This paper considers a competitive insurance market under moral hazard and adverseselection, in which both the agent’s preventive effort and self protection costs are unobservableby the insurance companies. We show that the results of the adverse s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::53ab6a8763a3b7b7f78f35e5e50be049
http://www.crest.fr/images/doctravail/2003-39.pdf
http://www.crest.fr/images/doctravail/2003-39.pdf