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pro vyhledávání: '"Bernhard Salow"'
There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3cc9f6c2ecd835d2eca2c9f39675ba2a
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https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b9883828-b536-4ed5-b043-fb1f66b5a10e
Autor:
Bernhard Salow
Publikováno v:
Mind. 129:999-1008
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3758531f097ef56677ca03478f707525
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz059
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz059
Autor:
Jeremy Goodman, Bernhard Salow
We give a probabilistic analysis of inductive knowledge and belief and explore its predictions concerning knowledge about the future, about laws of nature, and about the values of inexactly measured quantities. The analysis combines a theory of knowl
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http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.11501
http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.11501
Autor:
Bernhard Salow
Publikováno v:
Philosophy & Public Affairs. 45:8-26
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::84ebb112aecbed8c7849162c9b3b62ae
https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12083
https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12083
Autor:
Nilanjan Das, Bernhard Salow
Publikováno v:
Noûs. 52:3-23
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ad9fd997c685f8c97a5e41620d153102
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12158
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12158
Autor:
Bernhard Salow, Arif Ahmed
Publikováno v:
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 70(2)
Good’s theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to gather (reliable) information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that Good’s theorem is not platitudinous and may be false
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Autor:
Bernhard Salow
Publikováno v:
Mind. 127(507)
Suppose you’d like to believe that $\textit{p}$ (for example, that you are popular), whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in $\textit{Intentionally Biased Inquiry}$: you could look
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Autor:
Jeremy Goodman, Bernhard Salow
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 175(1)
Dorr et al. (Philos Stud 170:277–287, 2014) present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that
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Autor:
Catrin Campbell-Moore, Bernhard Salow
Publikováno v:
Campbell-Moore, C & Salow, B 2020, ' Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence ', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 98, no. 3, pp. 495-515 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305
It is natural to think that there's something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk avoidance that is both wide-spread and intuitively rati
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