Zobrazeno 1 - 10 of 11 pro vyhledávání: '"Benjamin Lennertz"'
2
Imprecise Credences and Acceptance
Autor: Benjamin Lennertz
Publikováno v: Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. 9
Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga’s challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Mos
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6c3bc5d1fee2baab356717f7d9123b60
https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2264
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3
Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes
Autor: Benjamin Lennertz
Publikováno v: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 51:62-79
I generalize the notion of a conditional attitude by bringing together two topics of inquiry. One is the ordinary inquiry into conditional attitudes. The other topic is the inquiry into the attitude of thinking that a proposition is likely, or having
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a5e250910ff8a29f1c2edd50fe7739f5
https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.53
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4
Quantificational Attitudes
Autor: Benjamin Lennertz
Publikováno v: The Journal of Philosophy. 118:585-613
The literature contains a popular argument in favor of the position that conditional attitudes (especially intentions and desires) are not simple attitudes with conditional contents but, rather, have a more complex structure. In this paper I show tha
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c0a6fe7db245e566c1ec090cdfab3e04
https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20211181140
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7
What might but must not be
Autor: Stephen Finlay, Benjamin Lennertz
We examine an objection to analysing the epistemic ‘might’ and ‘may’ as existential quantifiers over possibilities. Some claims that a proposition “might” be the case appear felicitous although, according to the quantifier analysis, they
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9fcee3ba0a63659e78fc4437f388fb05
https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/item/8xx19/what-might-but-must-not-be
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8
Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement
Autor: Benjamin Lennertz
Publikováno v: Synthese. 196:4775-4805
What we can call asymmetric disagreement occurs when one agent is in disagreement with another, but not vice-versa. In this paper, I give an example of and develop a framework for understanding this phenomenon. One pivotal feature of my example is th
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::27bd60103919acf25aa7b7529de661f4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1688-9
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9
Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences
Autor: Benjamin Lennertz
Publikováno v: Synthese. 194:2101-2119
In addition to beliefs, people have attitudes of confidence called credences. Combinations of credences, like combinations of beliefs, can be inconsistent. It is common to use tools from probability theory to understand the normative relationships be
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9ff9cfffe30798f2702f1f314c401579
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1039-7
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