Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"Benjamin A. Levinstein"'
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Review. 132:43-87
Chance both guides our credences and is an objective feature of the world. How and why we should conform our credences to chance depends on the underlying metaphysical account of what chance is. I use considerations of accuracy (how close your creden
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::367ca41206c49932c3bc5fc675e2c1b0
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10123774
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-10123774
Autor:
Preston Greene, Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Perspectives. 34:88-116
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::552255650c1019ee5e1e7f26cc074be4
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12138
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12138
Autor:
Nate Soares, Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Philosophy. 117:237-266
Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) and Causal Decision Theory (CDT) are the leading contenders as theories of rational action, but both face counterexamples. We present some new counterexamples, including one in which the optimal action is causally dom
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a5796ff6203804888363bea8493d0666
https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2020117516
https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2020117516
There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3cc9f6c2ecd835d2eca2c9f39675ba2a
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b9883828-b536-4ed5-b043-fb1f66b5a10e
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b9883828-b536-4ed5-b043-fb1f66b5a10e
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97:741-760
A number of recent arguments purport to show that imprecise credences are incompatible with accuracy-first epistemology. If correct, this conclusion suggests a conflict between evidential a...
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cc139c19398fdb0aaa1152358e491f36
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1545240
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1545240
Publikováno v:
Campbell-Moore, C & Levinstein, B A 2021, ' Strict Propriety is Weak ', Analysis, vol. 81, no. 1, anaa001, pp. 8-13 . https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa001
Considerations of accuracy – the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values – have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on specific ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2e62aeaecc130db036f26171605300b2
https://hdl.handle.net/1983/59798551-a731-48b7-a27b-938f7609340e
https://hdl.handle.net/1983/59798551-a731-48b7-a27b-938f7609340e
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 176:2919-2931
Some propositions are more epistemically important than others. Further, how important a proposition is is often a contingent matter—some propositions count more in some worlds than in others. Epistemic Utility Theory cannot accommodate this fact,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::caf1cac87a8270d9f564049cc9a5a238
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1157-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1157-9
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
Episteme. 14:59-69
Pettigrew offers new axiomatic constraints on legitimate measures of inaccuracy. His axiom called ‘Decomposition’ stipulates that legitimate measures of inaccuracy evaluate a credence function in part based on its level of calibration at a world.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::38833200b86c4b450b6bc3e837f38fa8
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.50
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.50
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 94:342-370
Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ff93b58832315368a672cd77901062b0
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12225
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12225
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein, Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Konek, J & Levinstein, B 2017, ' The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory ', Mind . https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw044
According to accuracy-first epistemology, accuracy is the fundamental epistemic good. Epistemic norms–Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, and so on–have their binding force in virtue of helping to secure this good. To make t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ee1c9dae1da891ff631cfe62e7d87fbd
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/166312154/Epistemic_Decision_Theory_POSTPRINT.pdf
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/166312154/Epistemic_Decision_Theory_POSTPRINT.pdf