Reaching Consensus Under a Deadline

Autor: Bannikova, Marina, Dery, Lihi, Obraztsova, Svetlana, Rabinovich, Zinovi, Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

Publikováno v: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 35(1), 1-42 (2021)

Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no one - an o

Externí odkaz: http://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07173

Collective decision-making under the influence of bribers and temporal constraints

Autor: Bannikova, Marina

Publikováno v: TDX (Tesis Doctorals en Xarxa)
TDR. Tesis Doctorales en Red
instname
Repositori Institucional de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Universitat Rovira i virgili (URV)

Jo estudio la connexió entre la corrupció i les característiques estructurals dels parlaments: nombre de seients, el nombre de partits representats, i regles de decisió adoptades. Amb l'aplicació d'enfocaments analítics i computacionals, a més

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::73aee8b8dbceeed875ae730251b84afd
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/TDX2303

The number of parties and decision making in legislatures

Autor: Jelnov, Artyom, Bannikova, Marina

Publikováno v: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Repositori Institucional de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Universitat Rovira i virgili (URV)

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which have to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist who is interested in a certain outcome of the vote. We show that the ease of manipulating a legisl

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::219b0b93d699bf0cbeaf682862dc5409
https://hdl.handle.net/2072/266572

Gathering support from rivals: the two agent case with random order

Autor: Giménez Gómez, José M. (José Manuel), Bannikova, Marina

Publikováno v: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
Repositori Institucional de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Universitat Rovira i virgili (URV)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname

Which alternative is selected when voters are called to participate in a sequential voting? Does the ordering matter? The current approach is the first attempt to analyze these questions. Specifically, we propose a two- alternative sequential voting

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::900ea97882efb7232427ac837be24846
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/260957

Corruption in representative democracy

Autor: Bannikova, Marina

Publikováno v: RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya)
Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname
Repositori Institucional de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Universitat Rovira i virgili (URV)

A parliament with n members, distributed among two parties, decides whether to accept or reject a certain proposal. Each member of the parliament votes in favour or against. If there are at least t members in favour, the proposal is accepted; otherwi

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::41358b6e9a72d88da3c1ec6c6c96d695
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/213635