Zobrazeno 1 - 2
of 2
pro vyhledávání: '"Balanquit, Romeo Matthew"'
Autor:
Balanquit, Romeo Matthew
This study presents how selection of equilibrium in a game with many equilibria can be made possible when the common knowledge assumption (CKA) is replaced by the notion of common belief. Essentially, this idea of pinning down an equilibrium by weake
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::9c5e9ed427c71690c9d8d831c2869812
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162635
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162635
Autor:
Balanquit, Romeo Matthew
This study sets a bank-run equilibrium analysis in a dynamic and incomplete information environment where agents can reconsider attempts to run on the bank over time. The typical static bank-run model is extended in this paper to capture the learning
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::1276853da015d179a04c13e7ed1dbf43
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162633
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/162633