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pro vyhledávání: '"Babichenko, A."'
Autor:
Adamovic, Drazen, Babichenko, Andrei
The representation theory of the Nappi-Witten VOA was initiated in arXiv:1104.3921 and arXiv:2011.14453. In this paper we use the technique of inverse quantum hamiltonian reduction to investigate the representation theory of the Nappi-Witten VOA $ V^
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.02093
We propose a dynamic product adoption persuasion model involving an impatient partially informed sender who gradually learns the state. In this model, the sender gathers information over time, and hence her posteriors' sequence forms a discrete-time
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.13964
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bou
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.16942
We consider the problem of fair division, where a set of indivisible goods should be distributed fairly among a set of agents with combinatorial valuations. To capture fairness, we adopt the notion of shares, where each agent is entitled to a fair sh
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01874
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The sender knows s
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.09011
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion with one informed sender and several uninformed receivers. The sender can affect receivers' beliefs via private signals, and the sender's objective depends on the combination of induced beliefs. We reduce th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.07672
We study information aggregation with a decision maker aggregating binary recommendations from symmetric agents. Each agent's recommendation depends on her private information about a hidden state. While the decision maker knows the prior distributio
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.03667
In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.11237
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action according to a variable information structure designed by a regulator. W
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2209.13688
Autor:
Babichenko, Anatolii1, Krasnikov, Igor1 ihor.krasnikov@khpi.edu.ua, Babichenko, Juliya2, Dzevochko, Oleksandr1, Lysachenko, Ihor1
Publikováno v:
Technology Audit & Production Reserves. 2024, Vol. 3 Issue 2(77), p43-46. 4p.
