Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 14
pro vyhledávání: '"BRUNO RAMOS MENDONÇA"'
Autor:
BRUNO RAMOS MENDONÇA
Publikováno v:
Manuscrito, Vol 44, Iss 2, Pp 157-165 (2021)
Abstract In this article, I review the new book by C. D. Novaes, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning (2020). I reconstruct the main themes and arguments presented in the work and criti
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/847478f82c634d0bb6efd2e76a65511a
Autor:
Bruno Ramos Mendonça
Publikováno v:
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 16, Iss 3, Pp 471-488 (2012)
This paper reconstructs Venn’s algebraic logic and identifies some of the philosophical notions concerning the nature of symbolic knowledge underlying his work. We show that Venn, in facing philosophical problems associated with his algebraic logic
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/bc8eeeca84b246e880c70917057d9b4d
Autor:
Bruno Ramos Mendonça
Publikováno v:
Logic and Logical Philosophy. :1-22
Logical omniscience states that the knowledge set of ordinary rational agents is closed for its logical consequences. Although epistemic logicians in general judge this principle unrealistic, there is no consensus on how it should be restrained. The
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9cb81e35bf6d1ec346ee79293bcb8726
https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.021
https://doi.org/10.12775/llp.2022.021
Autor:
Bruno Ramos Mendonça
Publikováno v:
Minds and Machines. 31:99-120
In current philosophy of information, different authors have been supporting the veridicality thesis (VT). According to this thesis, an epistemically-oriented concept of information must have truth as one of its necessary conditions. Two challenges c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::74241e5fa1a8ba408d909a696a546e03
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09547-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09547-2
Autor:
Bruno Ramos Mendonça, Walter Carnielli
Publikováno v:
Logical Investigations. 26:91-109
The traditional theory of semantic information, originally proposed by [Bar-Hillel, Carnap, 1953], provides a versatile and pretty plausible conception of what kind of thing semantic information is. It embodies, however, the so-called “scandal of d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c20ccf8693225892836cafc8fff20b77
https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2020-26-1-91-109
https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-1472-2020-26-1-91-109
Publikováno v:
Diagrammatic Representation and Inference ISBN: 9783030860615
Diagrams
Diagrams
We propose a variant of Euler’s Diagrammatic Method for Categorical Syllogistic. According to this variant, a categorical syllogism is valid without existential import if, and only if, there is one, and only one, way to unify the representations of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c905c7449cd4fb2afdd733a25849a2d8
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86062-2_18
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86062-2_18
Autor:
Bruno Ramos Mendonça
Publikováno v:
Perspectiva Filosófica. 47
Em Sobre o Sentido e a Referência, Frege (2009) propôs a seguinte questão (no que segue, chamarei essa questão de ‘problema de Frege’): como é possível que frequentemente ampliemos nosso conhecimento ao descobrir a ver-dade de identidades d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bff99ddc1251836c1fa3d2e8c24a994d
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.248899
https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2020.248899
Autor:
Bruno Ramos Mendonça, Walter Carnielli
Publikováno v:
Logic Journal of the IGPL. 28:1060-1072
We prove that the minimal Logic of Formal Inconsistency (LFI) $\mathsf{QmbC}$ (basic quantified logic of formal inconsistency) validates a weaker version of Fraïssé’s theorem (FT). LFIs are paraconsistent logics that relativize the Principle of E
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dc3905e254d3915466a8272d3466d6b3
https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzy073
https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzy073
Publikováno v:
Analytica - Revista de Filosofia. 18:109-121
“Argumento exuberante” é qualquer argumento dedutivamente válido tal que ele se mantém dedutivamente válido se enfraquecemos ou eliminamos uma ou mais premissas. “Retificação de um argumento exuberante” é qualquer procedimento que enfr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::854bc5f320625c4d7fc4ba7818f6d399
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v18i2.2739
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v18i2.2739