Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 185
pro vyhledávání: '"BABAIOFF, MOSHE"'
Autor:
Babaioff, Moshe, Morag, Noam Manaker
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation of indivisi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.11131
We consider a principal seller with $m$ heterogeneous products to sell to an additive buyer over independent items. The principal can offer an arbitrary menu of product bundles, but faces competition from smaller and more agile single-item sellers. T
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.13835
Autor:
Babaioff, Moshe, Feige, Uriel
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which allocation should
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.14575
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an unknown distr
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11596
We explore the performance of polynomial-time incentive-compatible mechanisms in single-crossing domains. Single-crossing domains were extensively studied in the economics literature. Roughly speaking, a domain is single crossing if monotonicity char
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.13247
In this paper we revisit the notion of simplicity in mechanisms. We consider a seller of $m$ items, facing a single buyer with valuation $v$. We observe that previous attempts to define complexity measures often fail to classify mechanisms that are i
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.09853
Autor:
Babaioff, Moshe, Feige, Uriel
We consider fair allocation of a set $M$ of indivisible goods to $n$ equally-entitled agents, with no monetary transfers. Every agent $i$ has a valuation $v_i$ from some given class of valuation functions. A share $s$ is a function that maps a pair $
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.07519
Autor:
Babaioff, Moshe, Lempel, Ronny, Lucier, Brendan, Menache, Ishai, Slivkins, Aleksandrs, Wong, Sam Chiu-Wai
Cloud computing customers often submit repeating jobs and computation pipelines on \emph{approximately} regular schedules, with arrival and running times that exhibit variance. This pattern, typical of training tasks in machine learning, allows custo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2203.01213
We study the classic bilateral trade setting. Myerson and Satterthwaite show that there is no Bayesian incentive compatible and budget-balanced mechanism that obtains the gains from trade of the first-best mechanism. Consider the random-offerer mecha
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2111.07790
In the early $20^{th}$ century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost tax on the usage of a public good induces a socially efficient level of use as an equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a "Pigouvian" tax may also induce other, socially ineffici
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.12023