Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 43
pro vyhledávání: '"Bård Harstad"'
Autor:
Jacopo Bizzotto, Bård Harstad
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 87:102920
Autor:
Bård Harstad
Publikováno v:
Interessekonflikter i norsk handelspolitikk. :86-104
Autor:
Bård Harstad
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Bård Harstad, Jacopo Bizzotto
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
For markets to work, buyers must know when products are of high quality. This paper provides a theoretical framework for studying the consequences of the certifier's identity, the characteristics of the best certifier, and the identity of the equilib
Autor:
Bård Harstad
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 166:124-151
A conservation good, such as the rainforest, is a hostage: it is possessed by S who may prefer to consume it, but B receives a larger value from continued conservation. A range of prices would make trade mutually beneficial. So, why doesn't B purchas
Autor:
Geir B. Asheim, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Diderik Lund, Karine Nyborg, Michael Hoel, Taran Fæhn, Mads Greaker, Bård Harstad, Cathrine Hagem
Publikováno v:
Science
The Paris Agreement can be strengthened by a treaty limiting global fossil fuel supply
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo: Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M)
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo: Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M)
Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we pre
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::081511d73efe532f75fd2708f68d6f45
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/76382
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/76382
Autor:
Bård Harstad, Marco Battaglini
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy
In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelections. We show that incumbents are pron
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::128435735b0dc4ddadecc967727e88b3
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/71880
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/71880
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association
This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, i.e., the Paretooptimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient for folk theore
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e6b366af63c891b37ab4bf28301f484d
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3406187
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3406187