Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 184
pro vyhledávání: '"Azarakhsh Malekian"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 68:8699-8721
We consider a two-sided streaming service platform that generates revenues by charging users a subscription fee for unlimited access to the content and compensates content providers (artists) through a revenue-sharing allocation rule. Platform users
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 14:218-256
When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and pri
Publikováno v:
Operations Research.
Alaei et al. consider the problem of a streaming platform that offers different set of contents with different subscription fees with the goal of maximizing revenue. They characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for the consumer preference
Publikováno v:
Operations Research. 70:2254-2263
What is the revenue prediction of a seller in selling digital goods when the seller does not have full information about the extent of externality of users? In “Technical Note—Revenue Volatility Under Uncertain Network Effects,” Baron, Hu, and
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 90:2857-2899
This paper develops a model of Bayesian learning from online reviews and investigates the conditions for learning the quality of a product and the speed of learning under different rating systems. A rating system provides information about reviews le
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 67:6030-6054
Motivated by applications in online advertising, we consider a class of maximization problems where the objective is a function of the sequence of actions and the running duration of each action. For these problems, we introduce the concepts of seque
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a platform's problem of collecting data from privacy sensitive users to estimate an underlying parameter of interest. We formulate this question as a Bayesian-optimal mechanism design problem, in which an individual can share her (verifia
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b5bfc9b28760ab2c057d55756e994027
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research. 44:1058-1086
We study an optimal auction problem for selecting a subset of agents to receive an item or service, whereby each agent’s service can be configured, the agent has multidimensional preferences over configurations, and there is a limit on the number o