Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form

Autor: Aymeric Lardon, Stéphane Gonzalez

Publikováno v: Mathematical Social Sciences. 114:28-38

We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out that the core, whenever it applies to appropriate classes of these games, coincides with a wide variety of prominent stability concepts in social choice

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cf4a2591393388140d06c22d4a679a1a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.09.001

Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products

Autor: Aymeric Lardon

Publikováno v: Annals of Operations Research. 287:285-302

In this article we consider Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products. We assume that the demand system is Shubik's (1980) and that firms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average cost. First, we show that the alpha and

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0175e25e7aff536d019960d7af94a974
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03351-7

An Optimization Characterization of the upper optimal complaint value

Autor: Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon

Publikováno v: Economics Letters
Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2020, 186, pp.108864. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108864⟩
Economics Letters, 2020, 186, pp.108864. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108864⟩

This article introduces the upper optimal complaint value for TU-games. The value is characterized by lexicographically minimizing a maximal complaint vector. Interestingly, this value coincides with EANSC value and (pre)-nucleolus for some classes o

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8c44483946d28ae81816d51dd986573d
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02417827

The Core in Bertrand Oligopoly TU-Games with Transferable Technologies

Autor: Aymeric Lardon

Publikováno v: B.E. Journal in Theoretical Economics, Topics in Theoretical Economics
B.E. Journal in Theoretical Economics, Topics in Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, 2019, 20 (1), ⟨10.1515/bejte-2018-0197⟩

In this article we study Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies under the α and β-approaches. We first prove that the core of any game can be partially characterized by associating a Bertrand oligopoly TU-game derived from the m

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c768305f7421f53ceffe9147ce6b8a24
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02470330

On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies

Autor: Aymeric Lardon

Publikováno v: Theory and Decision
Theory and Decision, Springer Verlag, 2019, 87 (4), pp.421-449. ⟨10.1007/s11238-019-09720-9⟩
Theory and Decision, 2019, 87 (4), pp.421-449. ⟨10.1007/s11238-019-09720-9⟩

In this article, we revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot competition in the presence of a cartel of firms that faces outsiders acting individually. This competition setting enables to deal with both non-cooperative and cooperat

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::838b9fd585e166a9d8116405356281b3
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02355341