Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Avner Shaked"'
Publikováno v:
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development. 25:691-705
This paper lends both theoretical and empirical support to the notion of optimal foreign direct investment (FDI) levels. It does so by uncovering an inverted-U-shaped relationship between FDI and human capital formation. The optimality of a particula
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3e8bfe688f97ecfc613baee9e1c72a32
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2015.1118527
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2015.1118527
Autor:
Ken Binmore, Avner Shaked
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 73:87-100
Where should experimental economics go next? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in suggesting that we could profit from tightening up our act.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6bc5fd002193572f95f9e56640814d7d
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.019
Publikováno v:
Sociological Methods & Research. 28:341-364
In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the popu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c50ba6d5e05580db9d03d21479487aaf
https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124100028003006
https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124100028003006
Publikováno v:
American Economic Review. 90(1):46-72
We consider a market with “red” and “green” workers, where labels are payoff irrelevant. Workers may acquire skills. Skilled workers search for vacancies, while firms search for workers. A unique symmetric equilibrium exists in which color is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b03024aea2e08edbe7413e529f6f11a5
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.90.1.46
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.90.1.46
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 28:447-463
The paper provides an explanation for altruistic behavior based on the matching and learning technology in the population. In a infinite structured population, in which individuals meet and interact with their neighbors, individuals learn by imitatin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6adf3745f7c71c3f4232f5fac46d6960
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050119
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050119
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 9:551-556
This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4f71b8a2660cb3e67a6e4514d573af33
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213855
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213855
Publikováno v:
Theoretical population biology. 80(2)
The phenomenon of group escape cannot be explained by an argument of risk dilution, applied to gregarious behaviour of passive prey whose risk of predation is equally shared by all group members (Hamilton, 1971). Instead, individuals at the tail of a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e6abf4eb97e345e30a8a8a2b9cd2c1b2
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21712051
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21712051
Autor:
Avner Shaked
We read two papers on Inequity Aversion by E. Fehr & K. Schmidt. We examine the structure and quality of their arguments and the use they make of rhetoric in their papers.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1ece3cc4df2f747a0eab190bc92746e4
http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/shaked/rhetoric/Rhetoric.pdf
http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/shaked/rhetoric/Rhetoric.pdf
Publikováno v:
Journal of mathematical biology. 52(5)
Gregarious behavior of potential prey was explained by Hamilton (1971) on the basis of risk-sharing: The probability of being picked up by a predator is small when one makes part of a large aggregate of prey. This argument holds only if the predator
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ceb6a63de5a200996d1656c1612a9c53
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16382311
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16382311
This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::430b479b93f368bae29c54425e3878b3
http://hdl.handle.net/11392/1207087
http://hdl.handle.net/11392/1207087