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pro vyhledávání: '"Avishay Aiche"'
Akademický článek
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Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Electronic Commerce Research
We investigate monopoly profit under a new online tying strategy, namely sequential bundling. This method allows customers to buy additional products at discounted prices immediately after purchasing one or some of the available products. This strate
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0e16ec9da3dcd5d82e427d9e5a3981cc
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-020-09452-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10660-020-09452-x
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 181:107-110
We apply the mixed measure space model of players to the analysis of smooth oligopolies with two types of players. Following Kannai (1966) and others, we use the asymptotic approach to obtain the structure of the asymptotic kernel for smooth Transfer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3adcd82e42b79a0ffb49652dff2d2b85
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.016
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.016
Autor:
Avishay Aiche
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 48:411-421
This paper studies vector-measure games in which the set of players is represented by a mixed measure space with atoms and with an atom-less part. The bargaining set introduced in Mas-Colell (J Math Econ 18(2):129–139, 1989) for a continuum exchang
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9a3f10bbea8b2a552c132b685f948c64
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0632-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0632-z
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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instname
In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain and the elasticity of the marginal cost of effort is increasing (decreasing), the effect of changes of players’ information on the equilibrium efforts and payoffs is unambiguou
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cee09610df785bcefd91a2f8bdc9e9c0
https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34844
https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34844
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
instname
In Tullock contests in which the common value of the prize is uncertain, information advantages are rewarded: if a player i has better information about the value than some other player j, then the payoff of i is greater or equal to the payoff of j,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c0e35e6c5b65295781073202e8447c10
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.017
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.017
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory Bulletin. 4:53-59
In this paper, we apply the framework of a public bad economy with a finite set of economic agents and a finite set of consumption commodities. The pollution of an agent is emitted into the air while consuming his consumption goods. A linear public b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::370c4b64d25a2ad12769b9ec7f1f8509
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-015-0080-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-015-0080-x
The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players
We study the asymptotic nucleolus of a smooth and symmetric oligopoly with an atomless sector. We show that under appropriate assumptions, the asymptotic nucleolus of the TU market game coincides with the unique TU competitive payoff distribution. Th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4af7fba34e65dba055d45d0a432a0e0b
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201208
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201208