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pro vyhledávání: '"Augias, Victor"'
We study how to optimally segment a monopolistic market given a redistributive objective. Optimal redistributive segmentations (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., richer consumers pay higher prices than poorer ones, and (ii) may requi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.14174
Autor:
Augias, Victor, Perez-Richet, Eduardo
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a possibly random
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11805
Autor:
Augias, Victor, Barreto, Daniel M. A.
We analyze a model of persuasion in which Receiver forms wishful non-Bayesian beliefs. The effectiveness of persuasion depends on Receiver's material stakes: it is more effective when intended to encourage risky behavior that potentially lead to a hi
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2011.13846
Consumer data can be used to sort consumers into different market segments, allowing a monopolist to charge different prices at each segment. We study consumer-optimal segmentations with redistributive concerns, i.e., that prioritize poorer consumers
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::24670077253de4dca9a9e3aa46ebc5a7
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04067226/file/2022_daniel_m_a_arreto_alexis_ghersengorin_victor_augias_price_discrimination_with_redistributive_concerns.pdf
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04067226/file/2022_daniel_m_a_arreto_alexis_ghersengorin_victor_augias_price_discrimination_with_redistributive_concerns.pdf