Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 208
pro vyhledávání: '"Attila Szolnoki"'
Publikováno v:
Nature Communications, Vol 15, Iss 1, Pp 1-15 (2024)
Abstract Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitra
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ca2b9927096e4e03bb6cc57edc623c91
Autor:
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 13, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2023)
Abstract Competing strategies in an evolutionary game model, or species in a biosystem, can easily form a larger unit which protects them from the invasion of an external actor. Such a defensive alliance may have two, three, four or even more members
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/0992edc53ea94fb5a3c826aa5b3185fb
Autor:
Chaoqian Wang, Attila Szolnoki
Publikováno v:
New Journal of Physics, Vol 26, Iss 5, p 053018 (2024)
Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between these persp
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/61d92dc421374421996bc962c593802b
Publikováno v:
eLife, Vol 12 (2023)
Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change in environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/6897f5b3ef2446ee8c5d0b9c7fe8ee53
Autor:
Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2021)
Abstract The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a ba
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4c11a0abd2c24916a7f81eab1c05657c
Publikováno v:
Journal of Physics: Complexity, Vol 4, Iss 4, p 045003 (2023)
A social dilemma implies that individuals will choose the defection strategy to maximize their individual gains. Reward is a powerful motivator to promote the evolution of cooperation, thus addressing the social dilemma. Nevertheless, it is costly si
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/69bd3f4cfd5a4cc2a1e8f4493d52fe75
Publikováno v:
iScience, Vol 24, Iss 8, Pp 102844- (2021)
Summary: Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be po
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/05dfa208d5e14754b64e47f8bb4cca01
Autor:
Chaoqian Wang, Attila Szolnoki
Publikováno v:
New Journal of Physics, Vol 24, Iss 12, p 123030 (2022)
According to the public goods game (PGG) protocol, participants decide freely whether they want to contribute to a common pool or not, but the resulting benefit is distributed equally. A conceptually similar dilemma situation may emerge when particip
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/8dd17d57e990428b85ff2c0996f11ef0
Publikováno v:
New Journal of Physics, Vol 23, Iss 5, p 053017 (2021)
Considering feedback of collective actions of cooperation on common resources has vital importance to reach sustainability. But such efforts may have not immediate consequence on the state of environment and it is unclear how they influence the strat
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/8ff50a509481498b85672f2eea5c0c92
Autor:
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc
Publikováno v:
New Journal of Physics, Vol 23, Iss 6, p 063068 (2021)
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing stra
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a198768c7b0c453e8773ffc05bdfc36a