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pro vyhledávání: '"Asseyer, Andreas"'
Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei unabhängigen Kapiteln in Vertragstheorie und Industrieökonomik. Die Kapitel 1 und 2 bearbeiten Fragestellungen der Vertragstheorie. In diesen Kapiteln studiere ich die Ausprägung der Informationsasymmetrien, die
Externí odkaz:
http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/18452/18386
Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas1 (AUTHOR) andreas.asseyer@fu-berlin.de, Weksler, Ran2 (AUTHOR) rweksler@econ.haifa.ac.il
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. May2024, Vol. 92 Issue 3, p651-686. 36p.
Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas
Publikováno v:
In International Journal of Industrial Organization July 2018 59:222-252
Akademický článek
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Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas
This paper studies the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination between downstream firms operating under different regulatory systems. I model a monopolistic intermediate good market in which production cost differences between downstream fi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::92069758a2be0989b572fff922fdb9d2
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/210989
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/210989
Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal–supervisor–agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the produc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::20b8b3116acd4136bfe1f22b5fd98c2a
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213845
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/213845
Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas1 (AUTHOR) andreas.asseyer@fu-berlin.de
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. Jul2022, Vol. 136 Issue 2, p191-193. 3p.
Autor:
Asseyer, Andreas
This paper studies optimal information disclosure under the threat of collusion. A principal seeks to procure a good from one of two agents who can collude against the principal. The first agent has a publicly known cost of production and the second
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::6f3a77a49f697008385f9dd63f0a0e4a
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145779
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/145779