Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 35
pro vyhledávání: '"Arnaud Dellis"'
Autor:
Arnaud Dellis
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 13, Iss 4, p 53 (2022)
Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? The paper investigates this question in the context of a laboratory experiment where a centrist candidate is added to the race between a left candidate and a right ca
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/5da261e4645048ae9fb2061c59eb1052
Autor:
Arnaud Dellis, Alain Paquet
Publikováno v:
Bilan du gouvernement de la CAQ. Entre nationalisme et pandémie ISBN: 9782763758633
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::69c9eb35b6eaeebe4894a76fd4faef87
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv30dxx70.11
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv30dxx70.11
Autor:
Mandar Oak, Arnaud Dellis
Publikováno v:
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 32:188-234
This article studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the inf
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::252cf709850f2c5529777f5e3a37abcb
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892339
https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629819892339
Autor:
Arnaud Dellis
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0130e4b0885b7329af8ee6faf08a2bab
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4027050
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4027050
Autor:
Arnaud Dellis
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 208:105595
Whom should an interest group lobby in a legislature? I develop a model of informational lobbying in which a legislature must decide on the allocation of district-specific goods and projects. An interest group chooses to search and provide informatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ecbb260149991d8b1d9fe09ee841a3e2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105595
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105595
Autor:
Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 35:579-618
Interest groups (IGs) lobby policymaker (PM) by offering verifiable, policy-relevant information. The PM is limited in (1) his ability to verify the information offered by the IGs (access constraint) and (2) the number of issues he can implement refo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d677f6bdc2b21033e4df5a939e7bb7f2
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz002
https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewz002
Autor:
Arnaud Dellis, Mandar Oak
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare. 46:1-38
We use the citizen-candidate model to study the differential incentives that different voting rules provide for candidate entry, and their effect on policy polarization. In particular, we show that allowing voters to cast multiple votes leads to equi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a50f8eb1f87daaa86d0e43c3a93bf031
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0900-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0900-9
Autor:
Mandar Oak, Arnaud Dellis
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies the role of subpoena power in enabling policymakers to make better informed decisions. In particular, we take into account the effect of subpoena power on the information voluntarily supplied by interest groups as well as the infor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::741fa9ba508bcaa8743162e795909f06
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940001
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940001
Autor:
Mandar Oak, Arnaud Dellis
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We develop a model of informational lobbying in which there are multiple issues and an uninformed policymaker must choose on each issue one of two policies, a reform or the status-quo. For each issue there is an informed interest group that favors th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9eab85992d6caeb3d3b61f82a082ec21
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2734444
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2734444