Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 125
pro vyhledávání: '"Antoine Loeper"'
Autor:
Wioletta Dziuda, Antoine Loeper
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo: Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M)
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
e-Archivo: Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (UC3M)
Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we pre
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::081511d73efe532f75fd2708f68d6f45
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/76382
http://hdl.handle.net/10852/76382
Autor:
Wioletta Dziuda, Antoine Loeper
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
instname
We analyze a dynamic extension of a parsimonious model of lawmaking in which preferences evolve over time and today’s policy becomes tomorrow’s status quo. Unlike in existing models of pivotal politics, policy makers’ voting behavior depends on
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
Loeper, A, Steiner, J & Stewart, C 2014, ' Influential opinion leaders ', The Economic Journal, vol. 124, no. 581, pp. 1147-1167 . https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12100
instname
Loeper, A, Steiner, J & Stewart, C 2014, ' Influential opinion leaders ', The Economic Journal, vol. 124, no. 581, pp. 1147-1167 . https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12100
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though follo
Autor:
Antoine Loeper, Wioletta Dziuda
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
instname
This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which i) preferences evolve overtime, ii) the interests of individuals are not perfectly aligned, and iii) the previous agreement becomes the next status quo and determines the payoffs until a ne
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::14d2436d6c1701fbf627be2f6c7d1877
https://doi.org/10.1086/686747
https://doi.org/10.1086/686747
Autor:
Antoine Loeper
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
instname
This paper analyzes the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities by representative democracies. The level of provision of each country is decided by a policy maker elected by majority rule at the country level. We compare the case in
Autor:
Antoine LOEPER
Publikováno v:
e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
instname
Antoine LOEPER
instname
Antoine LOEPER
We compare centralized and decentralized policy making in a federation in which policy heterogeneity is inherently costly and preferences vary across jurisdictions: all jurisdictions agree that some harmonization is desirable but no one agree on the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a6f2923d73f20ae307e6a145ccb6e54f
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/16622
http://hdl.handle.net/10016/16622
Autor:
Antoine Loeper
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper analyzes the provision of transnational public goods by sovereign democracies. The contribution of each country is decided by a representative elected by majority rule at the country level. We compare two cases: representatives can choose
Autor:
Antoine Loeper, Wioletta Dziuda
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Inclusive voting rules are rules that require the approval of a greater set of policy makers than a simple majority. Using a dynamic voting model with stochastic shocks, we identify a novel distortive effect of inclusive voting rules. Under inclusive
Autor:
Antoine Loeper
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a non cooperative game in which a continuum of heterogeneous individuals partition themselves into groups. A player's payoff depends on the group she chooses and the set of players who choose the same group as her.In the case of anonymous