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pro vyhledávání: '"Anthony S. Gillies"'
Autor:
Anthony S Gillies
Publikováno v:
Semantics and Pragmatics, Vol 3, Iss 0, Pp 1-42 (2010)
How do ordinary indicative conditionals manage to convey conditional information, information about what might or must be if such-and-such is or turns out to be the case? An old school thesis is that they do this by expressing something iffy: ordinar
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/6a4fe2f084734c8db212909522189de2
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies, Kai von Fintel
Publikováno v:
Springer Netherlands
In “Must ...stay ...strong!” (von Fintel and Gillies in Nat Lang Semant 18:351–383, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11050-010-9058-2 ), we set out to slay a dragon, or rather what we called The Mantra: that epistemic must has a modal force weake
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::85102615fb076ca9ee51cf8453b8b488
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130451
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130451
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies
Publikováno v:
Mind. 129:1-41
This paper has three main goals. First, to motivate a puzzle about how ignorance-expressing terms like maybe and if interact: they (surprisingly) iterate, and when they do they exhibit scopelessness. Second, to argue that there is an ambiguity in our
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies, Mary L. Rigdon
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
What motivates agents to choose pro-social but dominated actions in principal-agent interactions like the trust game? We investigate this by exploring the role higher-order beliefs about payoffs play in an incentivized laboratory experiment. We consi
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies, Kai von Fintel
Publikováno v:
Prof. von Fintel
This is the fourth installment in our trilogy of papers on epistemic modality.
It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Co
It is a recurring matra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Co
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 118:325-349
What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our
Autor:
Kai von Fintel, Anthony S. Gillies
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 117:77-98
Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies
Publikováno v:
Linguistics and Philosophy. 30:329-360
Orthodoxy has it that counterfactuals cannot be treated as strict conditionals. But there is a loophole: if the strictness is a function of context then maybe they can be so treated. I argue for a loophole analysis that treats ‘would’-counterfact
Autor:
Anthony S. Gillies
Publikováno v:
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language ISBN: 9780203206966
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5cf6ca2a94d0ad6bd525226d647cdeb8
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203206966.ch3_12
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203206966.ch3_12