Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 340
pro vyhledávání: '"Anreizvertrag"'
Autor:
Monika Gruszka
Die Darstellung des Modells aus der Sicht des Konfliktmanagements ermöglicht, die Beziehung zwischen dem Prinzipal und dem Agenten von der organisationstheoretischen und konflikttheoretischen Seite aus zu analysieren. Dabei ist das Modell der ‚hid
Autor:
Ricard Gil, Jordi Mondria
Publikováno v:
SERIEs. 2:335-358
This paper introduces and studies the role of managerial attention allocation constraints in incentive contracts. We extend the traditional moral-hazard benchmark model with multi-tasking and linear incentive contracts by letting the principal choose
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8273b04cbf4381edada332adcacb1510
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0059-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0059-2
Autor:
Gerhard Illing
Publikováno v:
Intereconomics. 35:64-71
During the last decade, there has been a significant bias towards bond financing on emerging markets, with private investors relying on a bail-out of bonds by the international community. This bias has been a main cause of the recent excessive fragil
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::98df6d90b886f514681df9a2163093b8
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02930129
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02930129
Autor:
Reinshagen, Felix
We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent’s effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ff2103a0750a979b95c0c6c255e7a174
Autor:
Ishida, Junichiro
This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere pos
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::be4132d4318c5548a9c3d7b8e1a562bc
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92703
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92703
Autor:
Larrauri, Iván M. Lucich
Using the budget-based scheme approach developed by Kirby et.al. (1991) and Reichelstein (1992), this paper establishes the optimal policy function in order to control hidden actions from managers of Public Water Utilities (PWU) regarding investments
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::dc4baba3488c56f120d21788a6541bd1
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55215
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55215
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. "Steeper" securities are better surplus
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::67a852d97bde40267b4d63c0f22e0dfb
In this paper we investigate current pricing practices at the 200 biggest airports in the European Union. Our analysis shows that airport incentive programs are, in general, a common tool of airport pricing as they are used at one third of all airpor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::6ce1aa81b233b54afd81d7d496464411
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59791
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59791
Autor:
Weinschenk, Philipp
We study a dynamic model of team production with moral hazard. We show that the players begin to invest effort only shortly before the time limit when the reward for solving the task is shared equally. We explore how the team can design contracts to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::aa28b67da8f717becbff6857746990ff
https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FDC-C
https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FDC-C