Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Anna Zseleva"'
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research
Mathematics of Operations Research, In press, ⟨10.1287/moor.2022.1325⟩
Mathematics of Operations Research. Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Mathematics of Operations Research, In press, ⟨10.1287/moor.2022.1325⟩
Mathematics of Operations Research. Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
International audience; We study repeated zero-sum games where one of the players pays a certain cost each time he changes his action. We derive the properties of the value and optimal strategies as a function of the ratio between the switching costs
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 50(4), 787-800. Springer
We present a general existence result for a type of equilibrium in normal-form games, which extends the concept of Nash equilibrium. We consider nonzero-sum normal-form games with an arbitrary number of players and arbitrary action spaces. We impose
Publikováno v:
Journal of Applied Probability, 56(3), 810-829. Cambridge University Press
We consider decision problems with arbitrary action spaces, deterministic transitions, and infinite time horizon. In the usual setup when probability measures are countably additive, a general version of Kuhn’s theorem implies under fairly general
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 48(2), 513-541. Springer
We examine the guarantee levels of the players in a type of zero sum games. We show how these levels depend on the sigma algebras that are being employed on the players' action spaces. We further argue that guarantee levels may therefore also depend
Publikováno v:
Operations Research, 67(5), 1209-1221. INFORMS
Motivated by the proliferation of user-generated product-review information and its widespread use, this note studies a market where consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to pay for a new product. Each consumer observes the binary
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 666-686. Elsevier Science
We consider two-player zero-sum games with infinite action spaces and bounded payoff functions. The players' strategies are finitely additive probability measures, called charges. Since a strategy profile does not always induce a unique expected payo
Publikováno v:
Operations Research Letters, 48(1), 93-95. Elsevier Science
We provide a characterization of the set of real-valued functions that can be the value function of some polynomial game. Specifically, we prove that a function u : R → R is the value function of some polynomial game if and only if u is a continuou
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::47a21032fb17cb58af58f85d6cb21e84