Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"Anna Mahtani"'
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Philosophy. 118:165-168
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::274d1b6f475516ac9c980fbb64b22062
https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118312
https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118312
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 120:309-327
Dutch book and accuracy arguments are used to justify certain rationality constraints on credence functions. Underlying these Dutch book and accuracy arguments are associated theorems, and I show that the interpretation of these theorems can vary alo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::afa186b9afe43b56328bbd38163c816a
https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa012
https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoaa012
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
The credence framework is used by scientists and social scientists in almost all disciplines, including economics and political theory, and it underpins policy choice in healthcare, transport, education, and numerous other areas. It is hard to overes
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
The ex ante Pareto principle has an intuitive pull, and it has been a principle of central importance since Harsanyi’s defence of utilitarianism (to be found in e.g. Harsanyi, Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2fdc9b4cf350d668c7d54d40cfc7584a
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/106214/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/106214/
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Richard Bradley and others endorse Reverse Bayesianism as the way to model awareness growth. I raise a problem for Reverse Bayesianism—at least for the general version that Bradley endorses—and argue that there is no plausible way to restrict the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1e5af52703e108eeec7b3a84e5985744
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103475/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103475/
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 177:727-745
In this paper I offer an alternative - the ‘dispositional account’ - to the standard account of imprecise probabilism. Whereas for the imprecise probabilist, an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of credence functions, on the disposition
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::83a85a4d8032f97010c0a69f0c8b0573
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1203-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1203-7
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 98:375-391
Sometimes a proposition is 'opaque' to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8e9a51ecb67262b9ea9f03d78f92d3f0
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12452
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12452
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
Language, Cognition, and Mind ISBN: 9783030159306
In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popular revision of orthodox Bayesianism: while the orthodox Bayesian claims that a rational agent’s belief-state can be represented by a single credenc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::807d051f701f6d4cb4f3197a5ddf7f1e
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15931-3_2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15931-3_2
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
Noûs. 52:69-87
Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpred
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::569585a66e6f2d9a7fa0097b8919419f
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12148
https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12148
Autor:
Anna Mahtani
Publikováno v:
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ISBN: 9780415250696
In ordinary conversation, we describe all sorts of different things as vague: you can have vague plans, vague ideas and vague aches and pains. In philosophy of language, in contrast, it is parts of language – words, expressions and so on – that a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6c314be0fcdeccb9bc35ec2206fbe1f0
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90521/
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90521/