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pro vyhledávání: '"Anja Schedel"'
We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum loads, cau
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e81883e9069f417f91bc83f09869cdbb
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.07435
http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.07435
Autor:
Tobias Harks, Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Programming.
We study a Stackelberg game with multiple leaders and a continuum of followers that are coupled via congestion effects. The followers’ problem constitutes a nonatomic congestion game, where a population of infinitesimal players is given and each pl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::dff8084d00b72eafbab3fc5c248287b2
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01672-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01672-9
Publikováno v:
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics. 33:1932-1996
In a seminal paper, Chen, Roughgarden and Valiant studied cost sharing protocols for network design with the objective to implement a low-cost Steiner forest as a Nash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open probl
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ff05a69487cff6b2047b9cffb9bfa0be
https://doi.org/10.1137/18m1173265
https://doi.org/10.1137/18m1173265
Autor:
Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Cost Sharing, Capacity Investment and Pricing in Networks ISBN: 9783658331696
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9254d52fda2f5495448c593f52959b06
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_5
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_5
Autor:
Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Cost Sharing, Capacity Investment and Pricing in Networks ISBN: 9783658331696
In the last chapter, we analyzed a two-stage problem in which in the first stage, payments for using edges of a network are set, and in the second stage, selfish players use the edges and pay for it. In this chapter, we consider a problem motivated b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4ee6188e2fb4550a472f744660fce370
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_4
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_4
Autor:
Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Mathematische Optimierung und Wirtschaftsmathematik | Mathematical Optimization and Economathematics ISBN: 9783658331696
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::67d9ff947443641130cb67cace832f0e
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2
Autor:
Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Cost Sharing, Capacity Investment and Pricing in Networks ISBN: 9783658331696
In the following chapter of this thesis, we consider a generalization of the well-known combinatorial Steiner forest problem in a game-theoretic context. In the Steiner forest problem, we are given an undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs, and
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::734523e6ad03f1a468675dcd9b622ae2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_3
Autor:
Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Cost Sharing, Capacity Investment and Pricing in Networks ISBN: 9783658331696
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2643bb1a37c13828f5377bbad666bd7f
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_1
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_1
Autor:
Anja Schedel
Publikováno v:
Cost Sharing, Capacity Investment and Pricing in Networks ISBN: 9783658331696
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::70f6ba279c57a6c82cf72840952ff80c
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33170-2_2
In cost sharing games with delays, a set of agents jointly allocates a finite subset of resources. Each resource has a fixed cost that has to be shared by the players, and each agent has a nonshareable player-specific delay for each resource. A promi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b8f353761186c6c43cb6e1e49ee8b79c