Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 78
pro vyhledávání: '"Andrzej Skrzypacz"'
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies.
We study the design of stress tests that provide information about aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in banks’ portfolios and impose contingent capital requirements. In the optimal static test, an adverse scenario fails all weak and some strong bank
Autor:
Martino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
Motivated by online advertising auctions, we study auction design in repeated auctions played by simple Artificial Intelligence algorithms (Q-learning). We find that first-price auctions with no additional feedback lead to tacit-collusive outcomes (b
Publikováno v:
Journal of Political Economy. 128:2542-2578
We study a Bayesian persuasion game in the context of real options. The Sender (firm) chooses signals to reveal to the Receiver (regulator) each period but has no long-term commitment power. The Receiver chooses when to exercise the option, affecting
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Michael Ostrovsky, Andrzej Skrzypacz
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
William Fuchs, Andrzej Skrzypacz
Publikováno v:
Bargaining ISBN: 9783030766658
In this chapter, we discuss a few recent theoretical papers studying the dynamics of negotiations.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::463408ae81fd4c23c295a72d73088c72
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_4
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_4
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
Bargaining Current Research and Future Directions
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver takes multiple actions. We compare a simultaneous procedure, in which the receiver takes all actions after the realization of a single signal, to a sequential procedure in which the receiv