Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 31
pro vyhledávání: '"Andrew T. Forcehimes"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Deliberative Democracy, Vol 6, Iss 2 (2010)
This essay examines the implications Wikipedia holds for theories of deliberative democracy. It argues that while similar in some respects, the mode of interaction within Wikipedia represents a distinctive form of “collaborative editing” that dep
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1a043fdf7f9d4cdeb95ce88977a62b5d
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes
Publikováno v:
Philosophia. 50:533-542
In this essay, I raise a puzzle concerning rational emotions. The puzzle arises from the fact that a handful of very plausible claims seem to commit us to the idea that whether a subject ought to have a certain emotion at a given time in part depends
Autor:
Luke Semrau, Andrew T. Forcehimes
Publikováno v:
Social Theory and Practice. 46:257-276
Personal relationships matter. Traditional Consequentialism, given its exclusive focus on agent-neutral goodness, struggles to account for this fact. A recent variant of the theory—one incorporating agent-relativity—is thought to succeed where it
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes
How should we understand the relationship between binary belief and degree of belief? To answer this question, we should look to desire. Whatever relationship we think holds between desire and degree of desire should be used as our model for the rela
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ea39b215d63423b501fe28ae96aee752
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/155066
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/155066
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau
Publikováno v:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 21:699-717
A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-mor
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97:46-56
Agent-relative consequentialism is thought attractive because it can secure agent-centred constraints while retaining consequentialism's compelling idea—the idea that it is always permissible to bring about the best available outcome. We argue, how
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau
Publikováno v:
Philosophia. 47:271-277
Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals ove
Democracies put political power in the hands of the people. But why should people have a say in the operations of the states that govern them? Are democratic states preferable to non-democratic states? If so, is there something intrinsically good abo
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau
Publikováno v:
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. 9:1-7
Do you have reason to reduce your carbon emissions? The answer, it seems, depends on what others do. If concerted, our efforts to mitigate the harms of climate change will be significant. If you act alone, your efforts will be merely costs. Examples
Autor:
Andrew T. Forcehimes, Luke Semrau
Thinking Through Utilitarianism: A Guide to Contemporary Arguments offers something new among texts elucidating the ethical theory known as Utilitarianism. Intended primarily for students ready to dig deeper into moral philosophy, it examines, in a d