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of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Andrew Dustan"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 200:752-781
Autor:
Andrew Dustan
Publikováno v:
Journal of Development Economics. 134:372-391
This paper uses variation in school assignments generated by Mexico City's public high school choice mechanism to document a strong causal influence of older siblings on their younger siblings' school choice behavior. The effects of older sibling adm
Commuting to educational opportunity? School choice effects of mass transit expansion in Mexico City
Autor:
Diana K.L. Ngo, Andrew Dustan
Publikováno v:
Economics of Education Review. 63:116-133
School choice policies aim to increase educational access by weakening the link between a student’s residence and his choice set, but long commutes and other barriers may constrain families from selecting otherwise-desirable schools. Leveraging a m
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 94:101755
We implement a laboratory experiment to study how strategy advice affects participant decisions in a school choice game. In the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, advice to choose the dominant strategy of truth-telling induces participants to do so.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We implement a laboratory experiment to study how strategy advice affects participants' decisions in a school choice game. In the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, strategy advice prompts more participants to choose the dominant stra
Autor:
Andrew Dustan
Publikováno v:
Journal of Development Economics. 143:102392
This paper estimates the effects of a massive, minimally targeted conditional cash transfer program in Mexico City's public high schools on graduation rates, test scores, and school choice. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits var
Publikováno v:
Journal of Human Resources, vol 52, iss 3
Winning admission to an elite school both promises modest rewards and imposes substantial risks on many students. Using variation in school assignment generated by the allocation mechanism, we ï¬ nd that admission to a system of elite public high s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d893e5127e0feb197b1181e1e0ff33ad
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5wv3b3r9
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5wv3b3r9